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Contents

A Realistic Theory of Perception — Arthur F. Holmes 3
The Protestant Reformation — W. Stanford Reid 8
William Tyndale: Reformer — Frances E. White 14

REVIEWS OF BOOKS

God, Man, and Ethics:
BERTOCCI FREE WILL, RESPONSIBILITY, AND GRACE
FERM (ed.) ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MORALS
RASMUSSEN CHRISTIAN SOCIAL ETHICS
Lloyd F. Dean 22

God, Man, and Religion:
EDWIN A. BURTT Q. M. LYON HENDRIK KRAEMER
BRADEN JESUS COMPARED
Philip C. Johnson 30

God, Man, and Science:
BECKWITH RELIGION, PHILOSOPHY, AND SCIENCE
ROWLAND MYSTERIES OF SCIENCE
CONNOLLY SCIENCE VERSUS PHILOSOPHY
MASCALL CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY AND NATURAL SCIENCE
Thomas H. Leith 33

DEKOSTER ALL YE THAT LABOR
Lloyd F. Dean 37

BAIRD PRESBYTERIAN LITURGIES
MORSCH THE USE OF MUSIC IN CHRISTIAN EDUCATION
Charles G. Schauffele 39

MURCH CO-OPERATION WITHOUT COMPROMISE
C. Milburn Keen, Jr. 41

HENRY (ed.) EVANGELICAL RESPONSIBILITY
HEBERT FUNDAMENTALISM AND THE CHURCH
Thomas H. Leith 42

CLASSIC COMMENTARY SERIES
Roger R. Nicole 45

UNGER (ed.) UNGER'S BIBLE DICTIONARY
Philip C. Johnson 45

SURVEY OF SIGNIFICANT ARTICLES
Thomas H. Leith 46

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IN THIS ISSUE . . .

Arthur F. Holmes, Ph.D., Assistant Professor of Bible and Philosophy is no stranger to readers of the *Review.* His article, "Aesthetics and Church Music" (September, 1957), was a refreshing analysis of church music in the light of the philosophy of art. His background is also well suited for his current contribution since his dissertation dealt with "The Realistic Argument in Twentieth Century English and American Epistemology." Modern problems demand an adequate Christian insight into epistemology — the issue between realism and idealism is one of the most vexing.

W. Stanford Reid, Ph.D., also returns to the pages of the *Review* after his stimulating article in the issue of May 1957 on "The Christian in the World." Again, he gives attention to the relation of the Christian to the world. His conclusion that the Reformation erased the fundamental division between the sacred and the secular is a telling stroke not only against Roman Catholic philosophy, but also against views held by too many evangelicals.

Continuing the emphasis on the Reformation is newcomer, Frances E. White, Professor of English at Asbury College, Wilmore, Kentucky. Her article approaches Tyndale not as a translator but as a pamphleteer — an emphasis that needs to be made in view of the influence of his writings on key figures in the English Reformation. Dr. White received her B.A. and M.A. from Wayne University and the Ph.D. from the University of Colorado. Her special field is Renaissance literature. Asbury College recognized her work by the award in the summer of 1956 of a research grant for study in England. She has written articles on literature, religion, and counseling for various periodicals including Columbia University's *The Review of Religion.* In addition to her present post at Asbury, Professor White has taught in the Detroit Public High Schools and at Wheaton College, Illinois. She is a member of the following learned societies: Phi Alpha Theta, Pi Lambda Theta, Modern Language Association, The Renaissance Society of America, The American Studies Association, College English Association, National Council of Teachers of English, Conference on College Composition and Communication, Kentucky Council of Teachers of English.

This journal is not an official publication of Gordon College or Gordon Divinity School. It is rather an independent effort sponsored by the persons whose names are listed as comprising the official staff of the publication. The school and editorial staff take no responsibility for the individual opinions expressed herein. It is hoped that while the statements made in articles may not always be definitive, they may be provocative of further discussion in important areas of Christian thought.

A REALISTIC THEORY OF PERCEPTION: THE COMMON SENSE ARGUMENT

ARTHUR F. HOLMES

The Nature of the Problem

Every realm of human discourse depends on its epistemological assumptions. This is as true of Christian thought as it is of secular, as true in theology and apologetics as it is in the philosophy of science and aesthetics. For on our answers regarding the nature of and possible objects of knowledge in general depend our answers to the problems of religious knowledge in particular. And, inasmuch as the knowledge of God may not be divorced from the knowledge of His handiwork, we are compelled to consider our knowledge of the external physical world and to come to grips with the problem of sense perception.

The history of theistic argumentation underscores the necessity of such considerations. The Thomistic proofs depended on the doctrines of intentionality and abstraction. Hume, both in his *Dialogues* and in the *Enquiry,* attacked the theological argument on the basis of his Lockean theory of ideas. It was he who compelled Kant to reject the usual theistic arguments, regardless of the novelty of *synthetic a priori judgments.*

Apologetics can never be the same again. They must be carefully examined and then, if they are not justifiable, they must be discarded. It is at this point that our present topic arises. Are we justified in building either apologetics or a Christian *Weltanschauung* on a realistic theory of perception? Realism is the view, first, that we know that something exists other than and independently of minds and ideas, and, second, that we know at least approximately what this something is. Data do not obscure reality: they reveal it. It should be noted that this definition does not restrict us either to a naive realism which holds that we know things just as they really are, or to a Lockean dualism which begets a Berkeleian subjectivism or a Humean scepticism. Realism is thus defined in opposition to two alternative views. Idealism, on the one hand, maintains that since only mental things can be thought, objects both are and are what they are because of some knowing mind: if ideas reveal anything, they reveal only mental reality. Phenomenalism, on the other hand, insists that nothing can be known beyond immediately perceived data. Ideas reveal nothing. Both physical and mental realities are unknowable.

We are asking whether Biblical Christianity *demands* a realistic theory of perception. The question is not the exegetical one: "Does the Bible teach a realistic theory of perception?" For we recognize that the Biblical writers did not stand in our philosophical context. Indeed, in the technical sence of the term, they have *no* philosophical context of thought at all. In

such matters, theirs is the viewpoint of the man in the street. In other words, they are naive realists. They tell us that the sun rises, that the sky is red, and that clothes are warm. This is perfectly legitimate for their purposes; but for philosophical or scientific purposes it is quite inadequate. Once we recognize the relativity of perception, the fact of illusion, the multiplicity of causal factors in sensation, the possible subjectivity of secondary qualities — and so on — we are forced to abandon naive realism in favor of a more sophisticated and defensible position.

But does this mean that we have no further obligation to Biblical revelation, that we are now "foot-loose and fancy-free," that we can become realists or phenomenalists or whatever we please? To this form of the question we give a negative answer and shall present two arguments for doing so.

The Systematic Argument

In the first place, there is what we shall call the systematic argument. The Christian world-and-life view both favors a realistic theory of perception and strengthens it in certain problem areas. We observe this in three areas of thought: creation, providence, and man. The work of God stems from His eternal counsels. Creation was in this sense the product of His mind. But creation was actualized *ex nihilo* and *ad extra.* Physical existence may accordingly be analogous to Divine existence and dependent on Deity, but it remains physical existence, quantitatively and qualitatively distinct from God. Further, the physical universe received its ontological status *prior* to the creation of man. It must therefore both be and be something independently of the human mind. Admittedly this does not show that physical particulars *could* not be modified by being known. It simply indicates that any such modifications, if they occur at all, are secondary and quite incidental. We know things *approximately* as they are. In other words, realism seems more likely than idealism.

The doctrine of providence points to God's continued superintendence of the entire cosmos, ordering its processes wisely and well. Here we can appreciate Descartes' famous argument that if any inaccurate ideas of the external world are directly caused by God, then God is a deceiver. For in His providence He has so arranged it that regardless of how much I modify my primitive naive realism, I cannot get along in life without reference to independent, external, physical objects. I find myself psychologically bound to such a commitment. Moreover, an ordering providence is able to guarantee adequate correlation between the content and object of knowledge, so that, within this Christian context of thought, we can justifiably claim to possess a meaningful knowledge of the external world. Man is not vainly struggling to adjust to his environment; he and his environment are providentially co-ordinated with each other. This is an assurance which the

phenomenalist lacks but the realist demands, and which the theist possesses.

The Christian concept of man also helps us to avoid traditional objections to a realistic theory of perception. We are committed to neither a Platonic nor a Cartesian dualism: the knower is neither a tragically imprisoned mind, nor a *res cogitans* externally related to a mechanistic *res extensio.* He is not the passive recipient of fleeting, atomistic sense-data from which he vainly struggles to reconstruct a meaningful world. No fatal cognitive partition exists between body and mind, nor between body and environment. Rather man is a psycho-physical unity, and the knower is the human personality *in toto.* Physiology, emotions, values, interests — these and more than these go to make up the complexity of the knower and the knowing process. Because the body is immersed and active in its physical environment, so is the whole man. He is actively engaged in observing, discriminating, categorizing, interpreting the structured world in which he finds himself.

We therefore contend that the Christian world and life view creates *prima facie* evidence for a realistic theory of perception, and sustains it against opposing positions by providing, first, a teleology and, second, a unified knower, to guarantee realistic knowledge. It must be reiterated that this is systematic justification, showing that realism is consistent with theism. It is the development of a *Weltanschauung,* not of an apologetic. No attempt has been made to defend theism as such.

The Common Sense Argument

We cannot stop here. If both apologetics and a *Weltanschauung* depend on epistemology, this latter must therefore be examined independently, lest we indulge in the fruitless recreation of building empty air castles. For the question will still be asked as to whether epistemological realism is philosophically defensible. We can neither ignore this question nor presuppose a positive answer. Ours is a faith that reasons, and intellectual honesty demands our attention. Moreover, it could be argued that the philosophical impossibility of realism outweighs our *prima facie* evidence. We must forestall such an attack.

We shall confine ourselves to the common sense argument, since this is at the same time the most confused and the most popular defense of realism. All realists use it, including those who dilute it to naivete or disguise it with more strictly logical considerations. In any case the result is that the non-realist usually misunderstands it and consequently abandons all hope for a realistic argument. We believe that, properly stated, common sense does provide adequate justification for retaining a realistic theory. The possibility of a Christian *a priorism* is not excluded. This is another matter which lies beyond the scope of the present paper.

The common sense argument must first be distinguished from an appeal to intuition or self-evident truths. Thomas Reid, for instance, laid it down as a first principle that "those things do really exist which we distinctly perceive by our senses, and are what we perceive them to be."[1] But as C. S. Peirce has pointed out,[2] the Scottish philosophers lived and died before it could be properly appreciated that in our highest activities, controlled by modern science with its microscopes and telescopes, we have in many regards outgrown the world of naivete. Nevertheless James McCosh,[3] and at times G. E. Moore, H. H. Price, George Santayana, and others, employ the test of self-evidence: some things are known immediately, apart from argumentation; they are truisms.

This intuitive test for truth has had a stormy history. We reject it on three counts. First, it confuses clarity with veracity. The fact that an idea is "clear and distinct" means only that it is open to analysis and available for possible verification. In itself clarity does not constitute verification. Second, the intuitive test is a private one that admits of no public examination. If I say that a truth is self-evident to me, the only refutation you need give is to say it is not self-evident to you. I can never get inside your consciousness and contradict you on that score. Third, as applied to the present issue, to say, as the ordinary man does, that we know intuitively that realism is true, is to fail to submit instinctive beliefs to philosophical scrutiny. This is the very point at which the naive realist fails: it is not a philosophical theory; it is pre-philosophical. Self-evidence and intuitiveness, then, amount to nothing more than veiled naivete. Nor does it help to adduce a *consensus gentium* argument. This proves nothing but that all ordinary men are equally naive.

The apparent self-evidence and universality of a belief do, however, serve one useful purpose. They attract attention and require that serious consideration be accorded to that belief. It cannot be superciliously discarded. In fact, the task of the philosopher is to analyze and refine such data, to interpret and systematize them. For one cannot begin philosophizing completely *ex nihilo,* but must proceed *in situ.* The realism posited by common sense may be modified and variously reconstructed, but it need not be forsaken. As A. C. Ewing says,[4] it survives "the acid test of philosophical study and criticism." We may not know as much as the naive realist would have us think, but it is pragmatically verifiable that we know more than

1. "Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man," VI, 5, *The Works of Thomas Reid,* D.D., ed. Sir William Hamilton (8th edition; 2 vols.; Edinburgh: James Thin, 1895), I. 445.
2. *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce,* eds. Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss (6 vols.; Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1931), V. 360.
3. *Realistic Philosophy* (2 vols.; New York: Scribners, 1890). I. 33-36.
4. *Idealism: A Critical Survey* (London: Methuen, 1933), p. 292.

the skeptic would allow. The only question is just how much we really do know in each specific case. This cannot be determined on an *a priori* basis, but must be decided by appropriate empirical means, popular or technical, depending on the subject matter.

We can go further than this. Not only is it true that we *need* not forsake realism, it is also true that we *cannot*. For man lives immersed in his environment; he thinks in an existential situation. He cannot escape the fact to which even David Hume alluded, that with all his philosophy he must still be a man.[5] John Locke had to retain a quality-free substance even though it was perforce unknown. Immanuel Kant had to posit a *ding-an-sich* even though his phenomena failed to reveal it. Hegel began his *Phenomenology of Mind* with the bare fact of being, out of which he differentiates subject and object. It is for this reason that Santayana speaks of animal faith, Sellars of external reference, Whitehead of perception in the mode of causal efficacy, and so on. For they are all agreed that, regardless of the logic of the case, man is psychologically compelled to accept the fact of a reality in which he is immersed.

Hume avoided this realistic conclusion by severing all relationships between common sense and philosophy. W. T. Stace does the same: he counts realism as unfounded as the belief in a unicorn on Mars.[6] He superciliously disregards anything he has not himself created out of the ghostly dance of atomistic sense-data. To such a viewpoint several replies can be made. First, the philosopher cannot safely afford to ignore any data, from no matter what source it may come. Second, the realistic hypothesis is not as trivial and fanciful as the notion of a unicorn on Mars. It is the practically unavoidable postulate of daily life and thought, and possesses considerable *prima facie* evidence. Third, the theory of atomistic sense-data is itself an unproven hypothesis, one which the present writer regards as more fanciful and unfounded than the realistic hypothesis itself. Fourth, not all beliefs are merely instinctive, even though they may begin as such. It is possible to distinguish some that are both psychologically and logically necessary from others that are merely customary and therefore naive.

How may this be done? It is necessary to examine the grounds of belief. We suggest four, in order to indicate a line of thought which can be developed. First, dialectic may develop the implications of alternative beliefs so as to place one in a more favorable light and show the inadequacy of others. Second, empirical evidence may justify some beliefs. Facts may be

5. *Enquiry*, sec. 1 (Open Court ed.; Lasalle, Illinois, 1952), p. 5.
6. "The Refutation of Realism," *Mind*, XLIII (1934), 152-155. Cf. "The Present Dilemma in Philosophy," *Journal of Philosophy*, XXXI (1934), 365 f.; *The Theory of Knowledge and Existence* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1932), p. 85 *passim*.

variously construed, it is true, but not all constructions are equally adequate or equally consistent. As in the sciences, one hypothesis may be preferable to others. The realistic hypothesis, it could be shown, finds considerable support in both behavioristic and phenomenological observation. Third, there are legitimate psychological grounds for believing. Physiology, temperament, environment, education, values, interests, etc., may in some regards be relative to the individual, but in many other regards they are invariably determined by the generic nature of human personality and the nature of the universe. If, then, these invariables lead us astray, reality itself is deceiving us, and we may as well resign ourselves to a permanent and impracticable skepticism that abandons all scientific and philosophic quests. Fourth, belief is grounded in a personal encounter which produces a knowledge claim. Two elements seem to be involved here: confrontation by the durable and impenetrable, and the awareness of a predicament, whether physical or logical. No theory of perception is complete until it has accounted for this element of encounter. In these terms the actual point at which a belief becomes really necessary does not depend on one's feelings or intuitions, but on the particular belief. It varies with the subject matter and its importance: the idea of a unicorn on Mars is not nearly as necessary as that of physical substances on earth.

This is what we mean by the common sense argument. Realism, which possesses *prima facie* evidence in common sense and in its consistency with theism, is justifiably retained because it withstands philosophical scrutiny and because its grounds are those of a genuinely necessary belief. Much more could and should be said. The problems of induction and causation, the status of categories and universals, the particular form of realism to be favored—all of these issues are vitally relevant. But we have chosen to discuss the common sense argument in the belief that it is the most basic issue and the most relevant for our present purposes.

THE PROTESTANT REFORMATION: THIRD DIMENSION IN WESTERN CIVILIZATION

W. Stanford Reid

Since the sixteenth century, historians have offered many different interpretations of the Protestant Reformation. Naturally, to most Protestants it was "a good thing," deriving ultimately from the work of the Holy Spirit in the Church. Roman Catholics, on the other hand, while admitting the

need for moral reform in the Church of that day have always declared it to have been a disaster — at least for the Protestants. Then there have been those outside both camps: atheists, Marxists, rationalists and others who like William Cobbett, Ernst Troeltsch and others, have believed it was primarily an economic movement inspired by a desire for profits and plunder, or a social revolt staged by the rising middle class, and resulting in the rise of new alien forces, ideas and practices in the western world.

In attempting to understand the movement, even from the Protestant standpoint a limited interpretation of its effect would seem to be contrary to both the Reformers' hopes and the historical facts. While stressing the essentially religious character of the movement one must realize also that it had a very wide influence on history and society impinging on every aspect of life. Indeed, it might well be said to have added to the medieval and renaissance "two-dimensional" interpretation of life a new "third dimension" which radically influenced the subsequent development of western civilization.

In elaborating on this interpretation of the Reformation, one should perhaps begin by explaining why the pre-Reformation civilization is termed "two-dimensional." The most obvious answer is that during the Middle Ages two predominant traditions moulded European thought and life. On the one hand, there was the old classical humanistic and pagan strain derived from Rome and through her from Greece, the two most influential thinkers being Plato and Aristotle. On the other hand, there was the Christian heritage which had, however, experienced such changes before the middle of the thirteenth century that it had become a sacramental type of religion very different from that of the New Testament. These two influences were, during the thirteenth century, fused by Thomas Aquinas into the greatest of all medieval syntheses to provide the man of that day with a "two-dimensional" world.

This Thomistic interpretation divided all reality into "nature" and "grace." "Nature" included not only the physical and biological world but also man's "lower" nature, his passions. It had been these latter which, gaining the mastery over his reason, had brought about his fall into sin. Yet this fall was not so serious that man could not by his reason understand the world in which he lived, and use it properly and adequately, even to the extent of proving the existence of God, Himself.

Yet reason was not sufficient, for it dealt only with "nature." If man were to inherit eternal life, he must needs know more than reason would teach and must do good works for salvation. Therefore he needed revelation to give him the necessary supra-natural knowledge and grace to strengthen him to achieve merit. For this purpose God had founded the

Church. As the mouthpiece of God upon earth it must teach man revealed truths: the doctrines of the Trinity, creation, and incarnation, final judgment etc., while at the same time giving him strength through the sacraments to do God's will in this life. Thus although reason and nature were sufficient for existence upon earth, entry into Heaven depended upon the Church and its ministrations.

Such a point of view meant a two-dimensional concept of life. The highest and best form of life was that of complete devotion to the things of the hereafter, its highest reach being monasticism. But for those who could not go this far obedience to Holy Mother Church was an absolute requirement for entry into bliss, whether one dug ditches or ruled an empire. Although one might use reason for the ordinary affairs of life, in all matters impinging on the matter of eternity the Church's doctrine was to be held supreme.

A point of view such as this was bound to find itself in difficulties sooner or later, and with the Renaissance of the Mediterranean lands in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, it came sooner rather than later. Coupled with, and partly caused by the economic revival which forced a modification of some medieval moral views, went a growing interest in the world of physical nature, and a return to ancient classical models for artistic inspiration. The outcome of these trends was the growth of faith in man as an individual, and an increased tendency to stress his worth and ability rather than his limitations.

The humanists of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries who held these views were not anti-Church, but felt that since for man this life (nature) was of primary importance, rather than concentrating on revelation and grace which related to the life to come, they should stress reason. This was a logical deduction from the medieval view that the dictates of man's unaided reason were a sufficient guide for the conduct of his earthly existence. Pico della Mirandola, for instance, while taking God for granted, stressed primarily man's glory and greatness. Similarly Machiavelli, ignoring God and the Church, felt that worldly success was the ultimate criterion of all action. The medieval world of "nature" had, in these circles, now taken the first place, the Church and its sacraments being left to those who were concerned more with the life to come.

Basically of course, the high medieval view of Aquinas and the common humanist position were really the same. They differed only in emphasis. Both philosophies maintaining the division between nature and grace, differed only in their views of the relative importance of the two spheres. The Church in the interests of eternity claimed to be superior to "secular" life, while humanism believing this life to be the more important matter for

man was continually trying to assert its independence of the Church. This antithesis became clearer as the Renaissance progressed, being demonstrated by the evolution of the art and literature of the period from the religious and ecclesiastical to the man-centered type of creation. Similarly there was the growing conviction amongst the various writers from Petrach through Pico della Mirandola, Pomponazzi and others to Castiglione that man by acting according to his natural reason could attain to virtue and achieve "the good life" here and now.

The belief in a two-dimensional life in the spheres of grace and nature was breaking down, for men, incapable of enduring the division within themselves which this required, were tending to turn exclusively to one or other of these aspects of reality. This is seen in the development of a more rigorous monasticism alongside of an increasing secularism. Nature and grace had finally separated, leaving man with a one-dimensional existence to the confusion of western civilization.

Into this chaotic state of affairs Martin Luther introduced a principle which was to all intents and purposes new. When this German monk grasped the meaning of the New Testament doctrine of justification by faith, he suddenly realized that salvation came not via the Church's sacraments, nor via the monastery's discipline, but as the direct gracious gift of God. There was, therefore, neither conflict nor separation between nature and grace. Nature had been created by God, and although degraded and cursed by man's sin, was included in God's redemptive purpose. Grace operated in nature, the best proof of this fact being that man was justified by faith alone, without the works of the law. And faith was the direct gift of God's Spirit, who works where and how He will in nature, outside the Church's sacraments. This was indeed a revolutionary point of view.

The movement originated by Luther found its continuator in Calvin at Geneva. While he recognized that the curse of sin was upon nature, including man, he also held that redemption introduced here and now, a new principle into nature itself, for nature in its "natural" state if properly used would, by grace, redound to the glory of God. Calvin had no idea that nature had to be sanctified by the blessing of the Church's rules or sacraments or that nature was independent of God's direct sanctifying redemptive purpose. Rather as the Christian in faith and obedience performed in the realm of nature the daily task to which he was called, he was glorifying God. In no sense did Calvin make a fundamental separation between the secular and religious life, for God's grace poured out upon nature made it the mirror of the sovereign Deity.

Such a point of view had a far-reaching influence upon the thought of those who accepted the New Testament doctrine of justification by faith.

Christian realism appeared, manifesting itself for instance, in the art of a Palissy in France, a Rembrandt or a Hals in Holland and a Scougall or a Jamesone in Scotland. These men, like many others of their day considered it their greatest privilege to manifest God's glory as it is revealed in nature. Similarly when one turns to the thought of the Calvinist Jerome Zanchius who wrote that theologians should continually study physical science since here too God was revealing himself to man, one finds a very different atmosphere from that of the middle ages. The development of experimental science owes much to this new outlook, for nature was held to be God's book revealing His glory whenever studied humbly and reverently.

In the less esoteric realms of politics, business and similar everyday activities, this new and different attitude to man's existence also made a deep impression. Out of it came Holland's struggle for national freedom from Spain, the Puritan battle for constitutional government in England and a crusade for liberty in numerous other lands. Moreover, since man might glorify God in all that he did in obedience to Him, it was a fundamental principle in Protestant thinking that even those who worked at the most mundane tasks could feel that they did so under the eye of God to show forth His praise. For this reason Christians were also to consider those less fortunate than themselves, helping them, not for merit, since Christ was their righteousness, but for the love and glory of God. In gratitude to Him they were to do all things which He set to their hands.

This was a third dimension in western civilization, and, while it embraced much that had gone before, its innovations revolutionized the two original dimensions, giving them depth and new meaning. Labor of all kinds this new approach made honorable, placing it in a new category, for men were not to find salvation by forsaking the world, but having received salvation by God's grace were to go forth to use the world for the manifestation of divine glory and grace. No doubt, advocates of this point of view have often perverted, twisted and used it for their own personal ends, but it still stands as one of the fundamental dimensions of western civilization. Whether men like it or not, so much of what they possess today in western civilization finds its roots in the religious revolution known as the Protestant Reformation.

Yet as one looks at the twentieth century world, one is obliged to admit that the Reformers' three-dimensional concept of life is gradually disappearing. One reason for this is that humanism has increasingly gained the ascendency in western thought. Rationalism and deism produced the French Revolution giving humanism one of its great victories. Then came nineteenth century scientific materialism with its two hard-visaged children, communism and fascism, who have been responsible for the rise of a new,

yet old, one-dimensional view of existence in the monolithic state. Under their denomination the individual rapidly becomes nothing more than a mere cog in a machine with Orwell's *1984* his ultimate destiny.

Another reason for the disappearance of the three-dimensional point of view is that there has taken place, since the French Revolution, a resurgence of Roman Catholicism. Valiant efforts have been made by the Roman Church to revive the old two-dimensional point of view by bringing back the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas. This type of thinking has caught the eyes of many intellectually weary Marxists, atheists and the like who, here and now under the aegis of Rome, are authorized to maintain the autonomy of reason, while by the grace vested in the Church they still have the assurance of the life to come. Although this is an approach somewhat different from that of current materialism, the results are really the same. Man as an individual before God disappears into the body of the Church. Living in a monolithic "natural" society dominated by the Church, he loses his identity, and at the same time a sense of his obligation and privilege to do all things in this life to the glory of God.

The revival of these two anti-Reformation points of view have given birth to totalitarianism both east and west of the Iron Curtain, with the result that those who still hold to a belief in man's responsibility to love and serve God in all circumstances and with all his being, must be continually on their guard. With growing industrial expansion, the increasing threat of war and the ever expanding powers of the state, materialistic or Roman Catholic totalitarianism may very easily gain control. If either one should be victorious, the outcome lies beyond the utmost reaches of our imagination.

In the light of this situation what is needed is a renewal and revival of the thought of the Reformation, particularly with regard to man's relationship to his environment. Modern man must be brought to realize that he is not merely a part of a machine, but is a creature of God made "to glorify and enjoy" Him. To do this those who are truly Protestants must look back to the rock whence they have been hewn, that they may work for another Reformation in which the basic principles of the Reformers will be carried forward to fruition. Only in this way will men return to a truly "three-dimensional" life.

WILLIAM TYNDALE, REFORMER: A STUDY OF PERSONAL INFLUENCE

FRANCES E. WHITE

The present age has come to think of William Tyndale as a translator. The contribution of Tyndale in respect to Bible translation is recognized almost universally, and the permanence of this contribution is evidenced in the many passages of his translation that remain in the beautiful and dignified King James Version. In 1936 most of the articles that appeared in commemoration of the four-hundredth anniversary of the martyrdom of Tyndale concerned his work as a translator, but in his own century, as well as in the next, he probably was equally well known as a pamphleteer.

His treatises were timely, and their appeal and influence were immediate and widespread. Tyndale proved that it was possible to give expression to highest truths with clarity and simplicity. A brief study affords no opportunity for analysis of the treatises, but perhaps there is value in noting a few instances of their general influence.

Foxe gives a proclamation made by the King as late as July 8, 1546, for the abolishing of Tyndale's and Coverdale's translation of the New Testament, and the books of Frith, Tyndale, Wyclif, Joy, Roy, Basil, Bale, Barnes, Coverdale, Turner, Tracy, or any other book that may contain heretical opinions. Anyone found in possession of any of these books after the last day of August is to suffer punishment.[1] Foxe lists from Tyndale's *The Parable of the Wicked Mammon* (1527) and *The Obedience of a Christian Man* (1527-28) fifty-four articles which had been gathered from these books by the bishops as errors and heresies and shows how injustice has been done by wresting passages from their context.

Although to some Tyndale was a cause for concern, to many others he was a source of strength and encouragement. John Frith, for example, who was admired even by his enemies for his learning and his deep sincerity, was helped greatly by his association with Tyndale. And Tyndale, in turn, received comfort and assistance from his young disciple. Christopher Anderson has said that "an affection subsisted between these two eminent men, akin to that between Paul and Timothy of old, though in one point the parallel fails — the youngest died first."[2]

One of the reformers who had retracted his opinions under pressure from the bishops was Thomas Bilney, who had been the means of convert-

1. John Foxe, *Acts and Monuments,* 8 vols., (London, 1843-1849), V, 565-566.
2. Christopher Anderson, *The Annals of the English Bible,* 2 vols., (London, 1845), I, 135.

ing Lambert and Latimer. *The Obedience of a Christian Man* together with Tyndale's New Testament helped to revive him and gave him strength to suffer martyrdom. Foxe thus describes his return to the faith:

> And so Bilney, meaning to give over his life for the testimony of Christ's gospel, told his friends that he would go up to Jerusalem, and so would see them no more; and immediately departed to Norfolk, and there preached first privily in households, to confirm the brethren and sisters, and also to confirm the anchoress, whom he had converted to Christ. Then preached he openly in the fields, confessing his fact [sic], and preaching publicly the doctrine which he before had abjured to be the very truth, and willed all men to beware by him, and never to trust to their fleshly friends in causes of religion. And so, setting forward on his journey toward the celestial, Jerusalem, he departed from thence to the anchoress in Norwich, and there gave her a New Testament of Tyndale's translation, and the Obedience of a Christian Man; whereupon he was apprehended and carried to prison, there to remain till the blind bishop Nixe sent up for a writ to burn him.[3]

James Bainham was another who had recanted under torture and then had suffered remorse for his weakness of spirit. He had been home scarcely a month before he began to bewail his abjuration. His conscience gave him no peace until he confessed his fall to his friends and asked God and all the world to forgive him. Foxe tells of his coming into St. Austin's, "with the New Testament in his hand in English, and the Obedience of a Christian Man in his bosom." He declared openly that he had denied God and prayed the people to forgive him. He also wrote letters to the Bishop and shortly after was apprehended and committed to the Tower of London.

A number who became martyrs were converted through the influence of Tyndale's writings. Richard Bayfield, a monk of Bury, was converted by Dr. Barnes, who had given him a New Testament in Latin, Tyndale's Testament in English, *The Parable of the Wicked Mammon,* and *The Obedience of a Christian Man.* John Tewkesbury, a leatherseller of London, was converted by reading Tyndale's New Testament and the *Wicked Mammon.*

If Cranmer and Latimer, whose preaching did much to promote the Reformation, were influenced by the continental reformers, they probably were influenced through Tyndale in large measure; for his writings, since they were in English, helped Englishmen to understand what was taking place in religious thought on the continent. In spirit and emphasis Latimer often is close to Tyndale. His sermon on "The Agony in the Garden," preached before King Edward VI, Good Friday, April 19, 1549, reminds one of Tyndale's emphasis upon the direct access which man has to God. Latimer says in this regard:

> Let us follow Christ which in his agony resorted to his father with his prayer. This must be our pattern to work by. Here I might dilate the matter as touching praying to saints, here we may learn not to pray to

3. Foxe, IV, 642.

saints. Christ bids us, *Ora patrem qui est in caelis.* Pray to thy father that is in heaven, to the creator, and not to any creature.[4]

Tyndale may be said to have influenced the Scottish Reformation, not only directly through his New Testament, but indirectly through the youthful Patrick Hamilton, who was martyred in 1528. Hamilton, according to Holinshed, was born of the noble family of the Hamiltons, being the nephew of the Earl of Arran.[5] Peter Lorimer places the date of his birth at approximately 1504.[6] Not much is known of his early life; but in 1517 he became Titular Abbot of the Abbey of Ferne, in Ross-shire, an appointment which would furnish ample funds for the young man's education. In 1520 he received his Master of Arts degree from the University of Paris, after which he continued his studies at the University of Louvain, where a college for the study of the ancient languages had been founded in 1507 under the direction of Erasmus. In 1523 he returned to Scotland and entered the University of St. Andrews, where he soon was admitted to the faculty. Within a few years, however, he brought down upon himself the wrath of the authorities because of his defense of Tyndale's New Testament. Hamilton fled to the continent, where most of his time was spent at the new University of Marburg, which had been founded under Protestant auspices. Here he came under the influence of Tyndale, Frith, and Lambert; and here he composed his treatise on the faith, *Patrick's Places,* the first doctrinal production of the Scottish Reformation.

This treatise, which was translated by John Frith from Latin into English, is indebted to Luther's earlier works and to Tyndale's *The Parable of the Wicked Mammon.* It is significant that this confession of faith was prized highly enough to be included in Knox's *History of the Reformation* and Foxe's *Acts and Monuments.* Concerning this work, D. H. Fleming says that it is more than a manifesto, "for it overflows with an earnest piety, and with evident desire to bring others to the feet of the master." [7]

The courage and enthusiasm with which Hamilton was fired through personal contact with the reformers led him to return to Scotland to preach the faith for which he died heroically at St. Andrews, on February 29, 1528. Alexander Smellie claims that it was Hamilton who brought to Scotland "the flavour and the fragrance of the German Reformation, when that Reformation was in its blossoming and gracious springtime." [8]

4. *Translations and Reprints from the Original Sources of European History* (Philadelphia: The Department of History of the University of Pennsylvania, 1897), Series for 1894, I, 20.
5. Holinshed, *Chronicles of England, Scotland, and Ireland,* 6 vols. (London, 1808), V, 754.
6. Peter Lorimer, *Patrick Hamilton, The First Preacher and Martyr of the Scottish Reformation* (London, 1857), p. 24.
7. David Hay Fleming, *The Reformation in Scotland* (London, 1910), p. 186.
8. Alexander Smellie, *The Reformation in its Literature* (London, 1925), p. 240.

The death of Hamilton, however, did not mean the end of his or of Tyndale's influence in Scotland. Many accepted Hamilton's teaching, and about twenty of his countrymen followed him to the stake or scaffold. Alexander Alane, or Alesius, who became the friend of Melanchthon and who played an important part in forwarding the cause of the Reformation in England and Germany, is just one of the many who were converted by the testimony of Hamilton. Knox records a certain Johne Lyndessay as saying concerning the burning of heretics, "Yf ye will burne tham, lett tham be brunt [sic] in how sellarris [deep cellars]; for the reik of Master Patrik Hammyltoun he infected as many as it blew upoun." [9]

How deeply Henry VIII was affected by the writings of Tyndale is somewhat difficult to determine; but it is noteworthy that the first effective measure in regard to the exaction of mortuaries was enacted within two years after Tyndale had written *The Obedience of a Christian Man,* in which he protested the avarice of the clergy. Foxe cites the complaint concerning mortuaries as it was considered by Parliament:

> II. The second cause was, the great polling and extreme extraction which the spiritual men used, in taking of corpses, presents, or mortuaries: for the children of the dead should all die for hunger and go a-begging, rather than they would of charity give to them the silly cow which the the dead man owed, if he had but only one; such was the charity of them! [10]

According to Strype, who printed a story told in a manuscript which was in the possession of Foxe and the substance of which was corroborated by George Wyatt, the grandson of Thomas Wyatt, the elder, Henry was introduced to *The Obedience* through Anne Boleyn. The Queen, who possessed a copy of the book, had lent it to Mrs. Gainsford, one of her maids of honor. Mrs. Gainsford's suitor, a Mr. George Zouch, who also was in the Queen's service, being in playful mood one day, seized it from his friend and refused to return it, despite her tears. Captivated by the book, he read it even at service time and was caught at this occupation by Dr. Sampson, Dean of the King's Chapel, who confiscated the book and delivered it to the Cardinal; for Wolsey had instructed Sampson to watch for such books, lest they fall into the King's hands.

In the meantime, the Queen asked for her book; and being told the circumstances, expressed no anger, but said, "Well, it shall be the dearest book that ever the Dean or Cardinal took away." Going to the King and falling upon her knees, the Lady desired him to obtain her book for her; and upon the King's token, the book was restored. She, then, most tenderly

9. John Knox, *The Works of John Knox,* ed. David Laing, 6 vols. (Edinburgh, 1854-1895), I, 42.

10. Foxe, IV, 611.

besought him to read it. He did so with delight and said, "This book is for me and all kings to read." [11]

It is necessary to note, however, that as Pollard intimates, Henry probably was Protestant only to the extent that he set great store in his own judgment; for no man was less tolerant of heresy than he.[12] His personal delight in *The Obedience* did not save it from condemnation. When he availed himself of the aid of heretics, it was for the purpose of overthrowing the Pope's authority in order that he himself might exercise supremacy in the State.[13] Tyndale's writings, of course helped materially to promote the idea of the supremacy of the King in the State; for a theory that insisted upon obedience to constituted authority because of God's express command afforded the Tudors a religious basis for despotism.

Although it is impossible to go into all of the ramifications of the controversy between Tyndale and Sir Thomas More, the conflict must be mentioned; for it is one of the best-known literary battles in history. In important respects, More both underrated and misinterpreted the reformers. He accused them of exciting rebellion and anarchy and seemed to ignore the fact that they vigorously supported civil authority. Tyndale, indeed, almost exaggerated the power of the State. More also accused the reformers of exalting faith to the detriment of reason; but to many Protestants at least, some of the reformers' doctrines, especially those pertaining to the sacraments, would seem more rational than More's.[14]

The furor occasioned by Tyndale's New Testament and the treatises of 1528 is evidenced in some of the happenings of the year 1531. On May 25 the New Testament was prohibited as a result of charges made by the bishops in the Court of Star Chamber. They claimed that "the translations of Tyndale and Joye were not truly translated; and moreover, that in them were prologues and prefaces that smelled of heresy." [15] In that same month Tonstall, Bishop of London, gathered together copies of Tyndale's New Testament as well as many other books and caused them to be burned openly in St. Paul's Churchyard.

As early as March 7, 1528, however, Tonstall had written Sir Thomas More, then Lord Chancellor, requesting him to confute Lutheran doctrines, and licensing him to read the books that contained them. An excerpt from Tonstall's letter will make apparent the concern of the clergy over these books.

11. John Strype, *General Index to the Historical and Biographical Works of John Strype*, 2 vols. (Oxford, 1828), I, Part 1, 171-173.
12. Albert Frederick Pollard, *Henry VIII* (London, Green, 1913), pp. 193-194.
13. James Gairdner, *Lollardy and the Reformation in England, An Historical Survey*, 4 vols. (London, Macmillan, 1908-1913), I, 307.
14. James Mackinnon, *The Origins of the Reformation* (New York, 1939), p. 394.
15. Foxe, IV, 696.

> Forasmuch as now of late, since the church of God through Germany hath been infected with heretics, there have been found many children of iniquity which have gone about to bring in the old and damnable heresy of Wickliff and Luther, translating them into our English tongue, and causing the books to be imprinted [and] brought in great number into this realm, which they have with all their endeavour gone about to infect with their pestilent doctrine, contrary to the Catholic faith; wherefore it is greatly to be feared, lest the Catholic truth be wholly brought in danger, except that good and learned men do stoutly withstand the malice of these wicked persons.[16]

As More read in preparation for this task, he became convinced that Tyndale was the most able and dangerous of these English reformers, and that against him most of his shafts must be directed. In June, 1529, then, he published a volume of more than 150 pages, bearing the following title:

> *A dialogue of Sir Thomas More knight* . . . wherein be treated divers matters, as of the veneration and worship of images and relics, praying to saints and going on pilgrimage, with many other things touching the pestilent sect of Luther and Tyndale, by the tone begune in Saxony, and by the tother labored to be brought into England.

In 1531 Tyndale issued his reply:

> *An Answer unto Sir Thomas More's Dialogue, made by Willyam Tindale.* First he declareth what the church is, and giveth a reason of certain words which Master More rebuketh in the translation of the New Testament.
>
> After that he answereth particularly unto every chapter which seemeth to have any appearance of truth through all his books. Awake thou that sleepest and stand up from death, and Christ shall give thee light. Ephesians v.

In this treatise, Tyndale fiercely attacked the wickedness and corruption of the day but made it clear that he wished to purify rather than destroy.

As soon as this work reached More, he prepared a reply, *The Confutation of Tyndale,* a tremendous, somewhat tiresome work, the first three books of which appeared in 1532 and the last six, in 1533. Tyndale allowed this attack to pass unnoticed, and retired from the controversy. More, however, was drawn into the battle again by a combatant on his own side, Saint German, a lawyer who blamed the conduct of the clergy toward the Lutherans.[17] About Easter, 1533, More published his *Apology,* in which he defended himself and the clergy against the charges of Saint German and in which he continued his attack of Tyndale, Frith, and others.

In 1532, or possibly 1533, Tyndale published his *Exposition upon the Fifth, Sixth and Seventh Chapters of Matthew,* in which he expounded the Sermon on the Mount so as to place emphasis upon those truths which were being discovered anew by the Reformation. Another work of some importance to the Reformation is *The Supper of the Lord,* issued anonymously in 1533. This treatise reinforces Frith's arguments in regard to the

16. Foxe, IV, 697.
17. J. F. Mozley, *William Tyndale* (London, 1937), p. 223. See also R. W. Chambers, *Thomas More* (London, Jonathan Cape, 1935), pp. 254-255.

sacrament of the Lord's Supper and defends Frith against More. It is thought that Tyndale withheld his name in order that he might not endanger Frith, who had been imprisoned for heresy.[18]

In 1559 *The Obedience of a Christian Man* was translated into Italian by Sebastiano Roccatagliata, Genoese, and was dedicated to Thomas Copley, then a Protestant, but later a recusant. From 1570 he was in exile, where he received knighthood, and a grant from Philip II of Spain of the title of Baron Copley of Gatton. A portion of the dedicatory letter (written in Italian and below translated into English) reads as follows:

> I have thought it to be a good thing, finding myself weak of body and very ill, to expend my idleness in some exercise of the soul. Although the auditing of letters still requires bodily force, nevertheless, a little is sufficient. Being of good disposition to translate some book, I have judged that book especially should be translated by me which might please you, my Lord, and which might be useful to students of language, profitable to each. I have, thus, my Lord, in this time of my misery and very great calamity, translated an English book by William Tyndale into Italian, primarily to honor your Lordship, to whom I owe my life, as well as other of my things, as well as that my fellow countrymen may see how much light there has been in English, how much knowledge, how much of the spirit of prophecy and judiciousness. In truth, books are not found in quantity, in number, I mean to say, which can compare with that book by William Tyndale on Theology. I say this according to my judgment. My Italian Lords in writing anything are acute, but William Tyndale in treating of Theology has been more acute, and not only most acute, but most knowing. But I cannot praise him as much as he merits. Those, thus, my Lord, who read his book of Christian obedience will judge whether I speak the truth, or not.[19]

A book which came out of Oxford University in 1643 also indicates something of the extent of the influence of Tyndale's teachings. The full title of the book reads:

> *Martin Luther. Davids Three Mighties: or Sovereignties three Champions: Being the three prime Reformers of the Protestant Religion, Luther, Calvin,*

18. Sometime after Christmas, 1532, Tyndale had written to Frith: "Dearly beloved brother Jacob, arm yourself with patience, be cold and circumspect, avoiding high questions, but expound the law truly. Sacraments without signification refuse. 'Of the presence of Christ's body in the Sacrament meddle as little as you can, that there appear no division among us. Barnes will be hot against you. The Saxons be sore on the affirmative, whether constant or obstinate, I remit it to God. Philip Melancthon is said to be with the French King.' Some in Antwerp say they saw him come to Paris with 150 horses. 'If the Frenchmen receive the Word of God he will plant the affirmative in them. George Joye would have put forth a treatise of the matter, but I have stopped him as yet. What he will do if he got money I wot not.' I would have the right use preached and the Presence to be an indifferent thing till the matter can be discussed at leisure." J. S. Brewer and James Gairdner, *Letters and Papers, Foreign and Domestic, of the Reign of Henry VIII* (London, 1882), VI, 184.

19. From a manuscript in the British Museum, King's Library, Royal 14 A VI, *Il Libro Gulielmo Tindalo, di obedienza Christiana: translato per Sebastiano Roccatagliato.* Strangely enough, this manuscript has not been noted by Tyndale's biographers.

Tindal, Faithfully cited, and affectionately presented to all the misled People of England, for their instruction and direction, how to deport themselves in the unhappy division betwixt the King and them.

That yet at the last by the light of these three Glorious Professors of the Gospel, they may the better discern both their own errors, and the impostures of their false Teachers.

Other Renowned Worthies since the Reformation have done honourable in the defence of Sovereignty, Howbeit they attained not unto the first three, 2 Sac. 23. v. 18.23.

Because this book is difficult to obtain, quotations are given at some length. In explaining his reason for writing this treatise the author has said:

> Nay my hope and charity doe as yet persuade my faith to beleeve, that hundreds of this Kingdome, if not thousands, even of those seduced wretches, that have gone out in this present horrid Rebellion against our most Gracious King, have gone out, like those two hundred in *Absalons* Rebellion against King *David, 2 Sam. 15. in the simplicity of their hearts,* and had they been suffered to have knowne, what some Divines were willing and ready to have imparted unto them, they themselves would have suffered as much as any, rather than have acted in that villany. And for their sakes it is, that I adventure the publishing these three Worthies opinions concerning the duty of Subjects to their Sovereigne though wicked and tyrannicall; that by the true Protestant Religion, the falsnesse and rottennesse of our new Reformers (as they would be reputed) may the more easilie be discovered, and that by their acknowledging such an indispensible through obedience to be due to the worst of Princes, these deceived ones may at the last bee shamed out of their Rebellion against the best.[20]

It is noteworthy that Tyndale's doctrine of civil obedience as found in *The Obedience of a Christian Man* was employed by at least this one anonymous writer at the time of the English Revolution, more than one hundred years after Tyndale's death.

At the conclusion of the tract under consideration, the author counsels the people of England:

> Here is a fair way of tryall presented unto you. Compare the doctrine and practises of those zealous Spirits in former times, and see and judge which comes nearest to the Spirit of God and of Christ; and beseech God that that Spirit of God and of Christ; and beseech God that that Spirit may possesse you; which is the prayer as well as the counsell of one that greatly longeth after you all in the bowells of Jesus Christ.[21]

Another indication of Tyndale's influence in the seventeenth century is to be found in a tract written by George Keith, Rector of Edburton, and published in London in 1674. Concerning his purpose in publishing it, Keith writes: "My design is to make it known, that we, the People in derision called Quakers are truest Protestants; for all, who have any knowledge [sic] of our Principles, whether by reading our Books, or hearing our Declarations, cannot but see, that those Testimonies of William Tindal are more agreeable unto our Principles, than unto those of any other People in these three Nations." [22]

20. P. [120].
21. P. 34.
22. George Keith, *A Looking-Glass for all those called Protestants in these three Nations. . . .* (London, 1674). The unique British Museum copy is bound in a volume labelled *Quaker Tracts.*

But along with this emphasis upon the theory of the supremacy of the King in the State Tyndale always expressed a strong belief in the supremacy of Christ and His Word in the Church. Christianity is intensely practical, and all of life, he believes, is to be measured by scriptural standards. There is no doubt that Tyndale was responsible not only for supplying an excellent translation of the Bible but for defending the supremacy of the Word as well. And here is a man who through his loyalty to the Word touched the lives of King, statesmen, churchmen, merchants, fellow reformers, humble laborers, and even the lads who guided the plough, for whose spiritual welfare he had been concerned when he himself was but a youth.

REVIEWS OF BOOKS

GOD, MAN AND ETHICS:

Free Will, Responsibility, and Grace, by Peter A. Bertocci. New York: Abingdon Press, 1957. 110 pp. $2.00.

The chapters of this book are essentially the lectures delivered by the Bowne Professor of Philosophy of Boston University at the 1956 faculty conference on religion in higher education at Montreat, North Carolina. This conference is sponsored jointly by the Board of Christian Education of the Presbyterian Church, U. S., and the Board of Education of the Methodist Church. The reader is advised that treatment of the topics is often descriptive rather than discriminative (8).

The first of the four chapters deals with God's love and human freedom. At the outset, Bertocci enunciates his test for truth — the principle of experiential coherence: a belief is warranted only if it is self-consistent and supported by more evidence than any other competing belief (12). Since we never have all the evidence, every position involves faith, "but no faith is acceptable unless it is guided by reason as far as possible" (13). The experience of freedom is the feeling of effort; introspectively, this is to be distinguished on an immediate basis from the feeling of wanting or desiring (17-18). "I come to myself as agent and not simply as process or unity in change, when I will" (19). "To say that the will is free is to say that the self can . . . initiate a process and influence further development" (19). "Within a matrix of self-experiences or self activities . . . willing functions inseparably from thinking and the life of desire" (20). "Unless one can think, there is no point to willing . . . By thinking, I mean the more orderly process of connecting ideas together and with the problem to be solved" (21). Unless there is free will (enabling the thinker to

resist his wishes in favor of the truth) no meaning is attainable (22). "The essential relation between God and man as persons . . . is that of free creativity within limits which are constantly to be explored"; this is what Bertocci understands to be the relation of love between God and man (34). "Thus God lives in the insecurity made necessary by the degree of man's freedom; and man lives in the insecurity of his limitations and his freedom" (35).

It seems to this reviewer that the key point in Bertocci's position as so far expounded is that at which he passes from an affirmation of freedom of the will as an immediately intuited experience of effort to the assertion that "to say that the will is free is to say that the self can . . . initiate a process" (19). Now, the first part of the definition *describes* an immediate feeling of purposive effort put forth without any attempt to go into relevant, explanatory metaphysics. Actually, it does not really deal with the freedom of the will but simply with the fact of willing. This is in principle the same kind of analysis that Bertocci later performs when he denies that the experience of obligation defines the best. There he insists that that experience is independent of any particular command (58). Thus, the immediate experience of willing is, in its immediacy, independent of any interpretative theory as to its nature and source. A person under hypnosis, *determined* to follow a certain *dictated and controlled* pattern of behavior has the same experience of putting forth purposive effort, but it would be clear to any observer that though "free" in one sense (doing what he wants to do at that moment), he is not free in the sense of what he wants to do being underived as in the second part of Bertocci's definition the will is viewed as *initiating* a process. Now, it surely is *possible* that what we *want* we do not originate but inherit from our sinful forebears; and, it being supported by the history of Biblical revelation, one may humbly suggest that it is *probable* — indeed, *most probable* in Bertocci's use of the term. Thus, man is free, as Jonathan Edwards said long ago, to will what he wants (not in the sense of "likes" but in the sense of desires-to-will), but he is not free to want what he wants — at least as regards the things that matter most; i.e., spiritual realities. Bertocci, speaking under the sponsorship of two Christian denominations, does not even consider the possibility that man's nature may be corrupt (including his will) as the Bible and, historically, both denominations have taught and the standards of the Southern Presbyterian denomination continue to teach.

The remaining chapters build on the first. In his discussion of moral obligation and God's providence, Bertocci gives further attention to the question of the extent of freedom, and here is quite willing to recognize the causal limitations on the *power* of the will to effect its choices (37). He

still insists, however, that the self in will agency freely initiates acts which not only "would not otherwise have taken place", but "in so willing, the will is not caused to will by any other internal or external factor" (36). But since he offers no more evidence than that originally presented — the immediate intuition of purposive effort directed toward selected goals — the original objection remains. The *immediate* intuition of purposive effort tells nothing as to why or on what ground the goals were selected or indeed the *ultimate* source or direction of the effort. It simply affirms the fact of will choice. And, certainly, the person under hypnosis chooses; he is, as a matter of fact, possessed of unusually clear perception of what he is willing and signal, sustained will agency as well as will power.

Bertocci asks, "If a human being has will agency, and if this means that he initiates activities which would otherwise not take place, on what grounds can we assert that God does in *exact* detail know, let alone control, the life of any person?" (42). The answer is easy. If man's initiation of activities is the ultimate source of the events which occur, then it would be difficult (answers have been given in terms of God's inhabiting an eternity in which even the uncaused acts of free creatures are all present to Him, and of His control resting on out-maneuvering His creatures) if not impossible to assert either omniscience or predestination. But, in terms of the data that Bertocci has presented, there is no necessity to conclude that man's initiation of the process is anything other than the immediate or proximate initiating of a series, with God as the ultimate source and initiator. It would still be true that those actions would not otherwise take place, for, that one particular series was chosen by God rather than another series equally possible to Him depended on a real and ultimately free choice — God's.

But, Bertocci concludes that if God does turn man's will, then, the responsibility is God's and not man's. Yet, he has not told us what he means by "responsibility." Certainly, if man wills what he wills as an expression of his own nature, then it is that man's choice and he is responsible for it. If we have any doubt as to whether he will be so held, we may merely consult God's decision on the subject and find it to be so. In fact, this is the ultimate difficulty with Bertocci's entire discussion. It proceeds with no recognition of the relevant facts of revelation. It surely is not unworthy to suggest that one who is understood to be a *Christian* scholar at a *Christian* conference sponsored by two *Christian* denominations ought to give heed to the *Christian* revelation as historically understood! What is the advantage of philosophizing on only part of the evidence — why ignore such a large and significant body of truth?

In the immediacy of man's experience, Bertocci also finds the irre-

ducible intuition of obligation, although he is quick to admit that though the form may always be similar, or even the same, the content of obligation is not universal (48-50). Guilt is also another irreducible experience (51). I experience guilt "only when I have obeyed what I believe to be my moral duty" (52). The experience of guilt is private and no one else "can remove my sense of guilt when I willfully do what is wrong" (53). Jesus thus could not have borne our guilt or done away with it; "however else the atonement may be interpreted, it cannot mean that guilt is atoned for" (54). Since Bertocci does not deny that another may bear the consequences of my sin, then presumably we are safe, at least psychologically, in asserting that the chastisement of our sin was on Christ. One may well wonder why Christ — if identified with the sinner as God the Son — could not feel our guilt. Bertocci is a personalistic idealist; he ought to be predisposed to all men living and moving and having their being in God as the ground of God's feeling in and for us (absolute idealism is not necessarily involved here).

He insists also that even a revelational command from God cannot give us an experience of obligation unless we accept it and respond to it within. This is simply the Christian assertion that man *feels* obligated because he is already made in the image of the God who speaks to him. On the other hand, from God's point of view, it may very well be that whether a person feels obligated or not, he is guilty if he violates the command of God. In fact, this is precisely what the *Christian* revelation says. God doesn't make man guilty, contrary to what he really is, he simply reveals him to be guilty.

Freedom, creativity, and obligation need a conception of the best to guide them, so Bertocci now attempts to define the good for man. Assuming a fellowship of love with God and a forgiving love for man as the Christian definition of the highest life (62), the problem remains as to what content 'love' entails. Essentially, the ideal of personality is full self-actualization (72); Christian love will attempt to realize this both for self and others. The specific values and virtues involved turn out to be basically those found in the Sermon on the Mount, I Corinthians 13, and such expressions. Incidentally, Bertocci continually stresses that the Christian's reward is not happiness but blessedness (cf. 86). Is he not aware of the fact that the Greek word here simply means happy? The real trouble in all of this, however, is that he not only *assumes* a definition of the Christian view of the highest life, but also *assumes* that this is established for his use and that all (or most all) the specifics of Christian ethics are valid. Since he has made it very clear in his discussion that he does not accept a verbally inspired text of Scripture, he has no right to import these values into his own view without a structure of justification. This is the trouble

with all non-revelational ethics: it cannot establish anything specific as obligatory except possibly on the basis of an *hypothetical* imperative.

In his final chapter, Bertocci deals with the grace of God as discovered through freedom. By way of summary, he does at this point attempt a brief defense of the validity of Jesus' life and claims. This defense rests on the possibility of man having "direct experiences of God, and that the Judeo-Christian tradition, culminating especially in Jesus' consciousness of God, has illuminated man's relation to God and God's relation to man" (88). Now, unless Bertocci is prepared to invalidate the claims of the other great religions and religious personages (which in other writings he is not prepared to do), this means that we are reduced to relativistic subjectivism as regards essential religious and ethical data. This follows from the fact that unless we have reason to believe that God has spoken consistently and infallibly (and the many competing religious traditions *taken together* can be neither consistent nor infallible) to man, we can never be sure as to the nature of God or His will for us, since all we have to turn to is the shifting empirical scene. If we attempt to validate the data through our own religious experience (cf. 88-89), we simply add another voice taking its stand on ineffable internal experience rather than on an objectified line of historical evidence such as traditional Christianity appeals to in the Biblical history.

The point of the chapter is, however, "that God does not and cannot change the will agency of a person, be he saint or sinner. To do so is to deny human freedom and responsibility" (104-5). "Grace is not forthcoming apart from a self-committing act of will agency" (106). One wonders whether Bertocci realizes that what he presents as a modern attempt to correlate responsibility and grace is essentially what Pelagius and Arminius taught many centuries ago. Biblically and rationally it is open to the same objections as the earlier views. From the first perspective, one may point to the deficient view of the depravity of man. Bertocci confirms this when he tells us in effect that he does not believe that man is totally depraved but only "that human nature is open to sin because it is open to creative self-development" (109). While this may have been true of Adam, it is certainly not true of man in his present fallen condition.

Lest the foregoing criticisms be interpreted as expressive of a low estimate of Dr. Bertocci's book, let us insist on the opposite. While the reviewer finds himself in disagreement with much that Bertocci says, he cannot refrain from applauding much else that is said and said extremely well. The essay is replete with numerous fundamental insights of a psychological, philosophical, and ethical nature. The argument is closely reasoned and the style is clear, smooth, and attractive — even inspirational. The study

of this book should serve to reawaken interest in the difficult problems attending an exact understanding of the relationship between free will, responsibility, and grace. That it treats the problems in a fresh, if not entirely original, manner will relieve some of the drabness that often attends the discussion of these themes in evangelical circles. The value of the little volume is inversely proportional to its size. —*Lloyd F. Dean*

Encyclopedia of Morals, ed. by Vergilius Ferm. New York: Philosophical Library, 1956. xii + 681 pp. $10.00.

The partnership between the head of the philosophy department at The College of Wooster and the Philosophical Library has resulted in yet another useful and up-to-date reference volume. With "substantial articles rather than brief notations of widely scattered topics" and the indexing of the topic contents for cross-reference purposes, this encyclopedia fills a distinct place in the bibliography of ethics. Not only are the major men and systems well represented, but much interesting material is presented by way of examples of social behavior among less well-known groups. To the latter end emphasis has been placed on the recent work of descriptive anthropologists.

The article on Puritan morals, by Professor Covey of Amherst, is notable for its appreciation of both Calvin and the Puritans and the refusal of its author to identify unfortunate social practices of the era with theological doctrines. There is also an unusual but quite proper stress on the moral beauty and sweetness of spirit of the Reformed people as well as their very real tolerance.

The book is well bound on good paper and is easily handled, though somewhat large. The index by names is quite thorough and should, with the topic index lists in the text, facilitate the cross-reference capability desired by the editor. —*Lloyd F. Dean*

Christian Social Ethics, by Albert T. Rasmussen. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1956. xv + 318 pp.

The subtitle of this volume, *Exerting Christian Influence,* well expresses the intention of its author: to make basic suggestions as to "what the Christian response should be toward the enormous pressures and intimidations of the world" (v). This he sees as a first step toward rectifying the timid and confused state of the Christian social witness before the world (vi). Albert Rasmussen is Professor of Social Ethics and the Sociology of Religion at Colgate Rochester Divinity School and his book appears to be quite suitable for use as a class text. To this end each chapter is followed by a list of key questions for discussion and a brief bibliography of recommended

readings. The latter is helpful; the former is to this reviewer always a mystery. Why should college students (in this case graduate students) need a list of questions for discussion made up in advance and presented to them in the text itself? If they are intelligent enough to be in college or graduate school, they should be able to raise their own questions — in fact, that should be part of the learning process. Certainly, the instructor does not need the list; if he does, he should go back to bricklaying. Mayhap it is thought that such questions are necessary for the unaided reader perusing the book on his own. Now, it must be admitted that such a volume is well-suited for independent study. However, the person interested and able enough to approach the material intelligently (others need not apply) can certainly raise his own questions. The presence of grade-school helps does not enhance a collegiate volume.

The entire development of the discussion centers around the concept of influence. Rasmussen begins by an attempt to define Christian influence: "Christian action is true evangelism, calling men to a life of witnessing, not only by talk, but also by deeds and expression in their careers in family, vocation, and citizenship" (13). Observing that we are all always in the process of influencing and being influenced, he then turns to the Christian's response and responsibility. At this point, he makes a very fine statement to the effect that what is needed is "not the private gospel or the social gospel — but the full gospel" (63). And, he goes on to insist that "Christianity is not a morality: it is a faith" (65). We are further told that man is a sinner and needs to be saved (69). Once saved by grace, he is to live by grace, his life open, as it were, to continuous divine criticism (78). Thus, he will be able to take a significant part in the present great revival of social responsibility on the part of the church (83-96).

Admitting, however, that this revival is only in its initial stages, Rasmussen details the reasons for the church's weakness despite its size. All of these factors, such as religious illiteracy, too much emphasis on success, and similar failings, must be confronted if one would rectify the present situation, but at this point in the discussion, one would have expected a clear exposition of the apostate condition of much of church life today. That the gospel is not preached and that members are not required to be regenerate are certainly the key troubles with the overwhelming majority of so-called 'Protestants'. That Rasmussen misses this point and makes extensive and unconditioned use throughout his book of quotations from a very large number of Neo-orthodox, Liberal, and Unitarian thinkers suggest that the general lack of doctrinal specificity of his discussions is not accidental but intended. The general tone of the volume would lead one to believe that he probably falls into the category of the Neo-orthodox. Though,

even here, he tends to be less forthright and emphatic than most of the leading dialectical theologians.

With the above as background, the Christian social ethic is presented as "responsive love in community" (162). After a discussion of how the church can be an influential and influencing body in the local community, Rasmussen presents guides for community influence. The many needs of the community that he mentions are real and important (219-226), but certainly here was an opportunity to make clear that the church's *primary* influence is spiritual. Indeed, the suggested list of community projects, if given serious support by the minister, would usurp just about all his time. Better that the minister should call these to the attention of his laymen that they should bear the major burden of the active Chrisian social witness to the community. Unless checked, the kind of emphasis Rasmussen makes would be absolutely certain to deprive the people of the *ministry* of the full gospel which he avowedly desires.

Disappointment with the author's spiritual insight grows alarmingly when in the chapter entitled, "Exerting Influence through Reconciliation", he speaks only to the subject of the avoidance of discrimination on the basis of the American ideal (228). Now this is an important subject, but surely for this very reason it deserves to be rooted in the fact that a social group spiritually reconciled to God through the redemption that is in Jesus Christ can tolerate no wall of partition between its members on any basis. Even the Biblical reasons for a non-segrated society that are relevant for the unbeliever are far less central and effective than this.

The two final chapters are concerned with Christian influence through vocation and politics. The first emphasizes the Christian doctrines of stewardship and vocation and how basic their responsibility is to our call in Christ. This is certainly a needed insistence — perhaps most of all for those who pride themselves on orthodoxy of doctrine. The last chapter properly underlines the dual citizenship of the Christian — in heaven and on earth, showing that both the individual and the church can have an effective Christian influence on the conduct and decisions of government. Here again, though, is an omission. At this point, the propriety of the church as a body speaking on controversial political matters constitutes a problem that must be dealt with. On what can the church pronounce? How far can it go in dealing with the issues? Can a majority vote be taken as the church's position? These and many other questions cry for answers. Rasmussen gives none.

Yet, this is a useful book. Its weaknesses are mostly those of omission, even granting that many related matters actually lie beyond the scope of the work. It fails to make unmistakably explicit the theological sub-structure

upon which it rests. It fails to bring to the fore the most relevant redemptive doctrinal considerations for Christian social living. It tends to treat the form and means of social ethics and bypasses their content — which is mostly taken for granted. And, it does not even raise, much less attempt to answer, some of the most relevant problems that attend Christian social living and influence today. It is none the less a useful tool. A detailed table of contents and a topically and sub-topically arranged index add to its value. Properly supplemented, it can be used profitably in evangelical seminaries, colleges, and churches. —*Lloyd F. Dean*

GOD, MAN, AND RELIGION:

Man Seeks the Divine, by Edwin A. Burtt. New York: Harper and Bros., 1957. xii + 561 pp.

The Great Religions, by Q. M. Lyon. New York: The Odyssey Press, 1957. xiv + 732 pp.

Religion and the Christian Faith, by Hendrik Kraemer. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1957. 461 pp. $6.00.

Here are three recent books in the general field of comparative religions. The books by Burtt and Lyon are in the humanistic tradition that characterizes so many books in this field. Kraemer's book is from a totally different position, that of revelation and Christian truth as contrasted not compared with the religions of the world. The three together give a good picture of the opposing attitudes in Christendom today.

Burtt's book is excellently written, as might be expected, coming from one of the most lucid writers in the modern religio-philosophical field. Burtt is frankly a humanist and makes it clear that for him "revelation" means only the product of man's search for God, and all religions are from this point of view equal. Burtt's criterion for judging religion is put forward modestly as "a suggested historical perspective." There are "two great human needs and two corresponding dominant human concerns." The two needs are to master the forces of nature and to live with other human beings. Primitive religion has its dominant concern with the first need and "civilized" religions with the second. By this one can easily distinguish between primitive and civilized religions or elements in religion. Burtt very wisely does not try very hard to apply this hopelessly inadequate perspective to the religions he discusses. The rest of the book takes up the major world religions, largely on the basis of their ethical content. The book is not intended for an introduction and assumes that the reader is fairly well acquainted with basic doctrinal and historical facts. It is an excellent study

of the religions with some very illuminating passages. There is a kinship between the thinking of Burtt and these man-made religions which gives him a sympathetic and acute insight. It is only in dealing with Judaism and Christianity, that Burtt seems to miss the meaning and greatness, even from his own standpoint. Considering all religions as an evolutionary progress to some rather vague human perfection, it is suggested that Christianity has taken us about as far as it can and the next development is about due. Burtt elects as possible candidates for the next step beyond Christ Mahatma Ghandi and psychotherapy.

Dr. Lyon, professor of philosophy at the University of Mississippi, is less frankly but no less obviously humanistic in his approach. His criterion for evaluation is "maturity" which is to be determined by a number of points, such as exclusion of magic and mythology, commitment to truth, universality and mystic sensitivity. These are presented not as final but "to stimulate thought and encourage independent judgment." With this perspective the various great religions are considered in turn. At the close of each section there is an attempted evaluation of the religion as to its maturity. The tone and spirit of the book make it sound like a senior seminar in the philosophy of religion with students' judgment summed up at the close of each discussion. Though lengthy, the treatment of each religion is not too well organized and results in a rather sketchy consideration which would leave the beginning student neither too clear or too impressed by these great religions. As usual, Christianity is introduced and dismissed rather hastily like a poor relation. Lyon too thinks that Ghandi is an excellent choice as a saint for the new religion. The "mature" religion will apparently be a synthesis of the best in all the others.

To turn to Kraemer after the other two is like coming out of a dark foggy forest into the clear bright sunlight. *Religion and the Christian Faith* is the sequel or reaffirmation of Kraemer's influential *Christian Message in a Non-Christian World,* published in 1938. The theme of the present book is "how to relate intelligibly . . . the Biblical revelation to the many religions and the diverse claims for truth." This is of utmost importance "simply because we are challenged by the existence and reality of the non-Christian religions more directly than ever since A.D. 312, with the exception of Islam's great assault between the seventh and sixteenth centuries." (p. 18) Kraemer's thesis, as in the previous book, is that Christianity is revelation and therefore completely different from all the religions and philosophies of men. "Religion speaks about what man thinks of God, Revelation speaks of what God thinks of men." (144) Over against the idea of natural theology and the misuse of "general revelation" which has weakened Christian apologetics, philosophy and theology for hundreds of

years, he sets forth the "discontinuity" between man's reasoning and God's revelation. Kraemer at this point follows Calvin much more closely than Barth, and establishes his point with a careful exegesis of Roman's 1. "God remains, by the revelation of His everlasting power and divinity, of His wrath, and in the new aeon by his act of redemption in Christ, in constant dialogue with man. . . . The religious consciousness of man is unwittingly, man's bad conscience in relation to Him, knowing Him and yet refusing to know Him." (p. 308-9)

Kraemer takes up two outstanding modern thinkers as illustrations of his theme, Radhakrishnan at the beginning and Tillich at the end. Both the Hindu and the Christian fail in their basic thesis and the two are essentially one though totally different in method and results. Radhakrishnan holds that all religions are of equal value, although Hinduism, since it is most keenly aware of this, is most useful. We are not concerned about value says Kraemer, but truth and in Christ alone is the truth. Tillich, he says, in his attempted wedding of philosophy and theology or Christianity, fails from the same basic error in his thinking — relativism. However high man may reach in his search for truth, he cannot by seeking arrive at God. The great proclamation of the Bible from beginning to end is that Christ is the Way, the Truth and the Life, and neither is their salvation or revelation in any other.

Kraemer may be too dialectical in his writing to suit some. He is undoubtedly too "neo-orthodox" in his treatment of the Bible for evangelicals. Nevertheless, this rare and eloquent proclamation of the revelation of God in Christ as the sole way of truth and life should be read and assimilated by every Christian pastor, teacher, missionary and student. It is a powerful light to clear away many of the shadows and distortions that have weakened Christian thinking from Justin Martyr until today. It is a drastic but positive approach to the challenge of our day which brings us again to the power and vigor of the early Church. — *Philip C. Johnson*

Jesus Compared, by Charles S. Braden. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1957. ix + 220 pp.

Can the Incomparable be compared? The answer is yes, if what is actually compared is simply certain teachings or the religious organizations that have followed great leaders. The Incarnate Word, however, cannot be compared to men, either historical or legendary, in His essential person and work. The Jesus compared by Dr. Braden with other religious leaders is the "liberal Jesus," the creation of modern thinking who bears little resemblance to the Christ of God. He is a good man, a remarkable teacher, and the subject of many interesting legends. Thus he is very much like Buddha, Confucius, Mohammed and others.

It is interesting to see that even this apocopated Jesus finds little true resemblance in the lives of others. Dr. Braden takes the fantastic, admittedly legendary accounts of the miracles attending the birth of Buddha or Mohammed and strains to make them appear of the same nature as the story of the birth of Christ. It would seem hardly possible to compare the almost invisible figure of Lao-Tzu with the clear historicity of Christ, yet this too is attempted. What is even more strange is the comparison sought between a completely unhistorical figure like Krishna with Jesus. Braden's failure to draw any line between history and legend, fact and fancy, even when such are admitted to exist, takes away much of the effect of the comparisons. This is most strikingly demonstrated when in comparing Jesus and Moses, he dwells on the extravagances of the Talmud rather than the Biblical account.

In regard to the doctrines of the various religions, there is, of course a real basis for comparison. At this point Dr. Braden is much more helpful. Here, however, the failure to appreciate the Biblical doctrines of sin and justification which are basic to an understanding of the message of Jesus makes indistinct the vast differences in the several systems of salvation. Similar sounding ethical positions may be worlds apart because of the foundational presuppositions on which they stand. Also, the vital and central place of the atoning work of Christ is continually minimized. This would make any real comparison almost meaningless, for it is in His person and redemptive work and not simply in His ethics that Jesus stands incomparably above all others.

The book is helpful for the light it throws on some of the other religions studies, but it is not very enlightening in its major purpose of setting side by side Jesus and the religious innovators of the past.

—*Philip C. Johnson*

GOD, MAN AND SCIENCE:

Religion, Philosophy, and Science, by B. P. Beckwith. New York: Philosophical Library, Inc., 1957. 241 pp. $3.75.

Mysteries of Science, by John Rowland. New York: Philosophical Library, Inc., 1957. ix + 214 pp. $6.00.

Science Versus Philosophy, by F. G. Connolly. New York: Philosophical Library, Inc., 1957. 90 pp. $3.75.

Christian Theology and Natural Science, by E. L. Mascall. London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1957. xxi + 328 pp. 25 shillings.

About the only thing that the above books have in common is a claim to evaluate adequately modern science. Yet, if Santayana was correct in stating that "it is a great advantage for a system of philosophy to be sub-

stantially true", some of them, at least, cannot have claimed the privilege by their evaluation. Rather, they must plead guilty to La Rochefoucauld's indictment that such philosophies, while triumphing easily over past and future evils, often allow present evils to triumph over them.

If scientism is one of these evils, Beckwith's book, which asserts that all truth can be created only by using scientific methods, has surely succumbed. Written in frankly logical positivistic light, it pretends to obviate religion and philosophy as sources of, or clues to, new truth. It is impossible briefly to evaluate this thesis save to note its decreasing acceptance today in so definitive a form. However, one has here as flagrant a presentation of the attitude in a simply written manner as is likely to be found. If this is the book's chief value it is its chief weakness, for modern analytic philosophy is neither capable of as simple a presentation, nor is it as cut and dried in principle as this volume might lead the novice to think. The nuances of analysis, operationism, general semantics, and the logical positivism of a generation ago are ignored or confused as to distinctives. The growing interest exhibited in both theological and philosophical camps, particularly in England, on common problems of language and the relations of meaning, truth, and revelation are not even mentioned. (See Foster, *Mystery and Philosophy;* Ramsey, *Religious Language;* Macintyre, *Metaphysical Beliefs;* all published by S.C.M. Press; Ramsey, *Miracles,* Oxford; Pap, *Elements of Analytic Philosophy,* Macmillan; Mitchell, *Faith and Logic,* Allen & Unwin; Ayer et al, *The Revolution in Philosophy,* Macmillan; and Urmson, *Philosophical Analysis,* Oxford.) Finally, throughout, the book reads like a polemic in a manner most unbecoming to the wonted precision and logic of the method espoused.

The work may then be recommended for stimulation but, abhoring its politicking crudities, the reviewer would recommend reading other analytic writings, such as those listed above, in areas of interest. This will aid in grasping whatever clarity, rigor, and usefulness the methods discussed, stripped of the garb of extreme scientism, may bring to contemporary Christian thought.

If a somewhat mystical attitude toward the bounds between science and a rather irrational religious philosophy is another evil of our time, Rowland must be counted a victim. His book, with its goals of pointing out the limits of science in its method and in its subject matter (and the oversimplification of materialistic philosophy) is of great value in the points it scores against a scientism like that of the volume above. The analysis and criticism of some attitudes in contemporary physics, biology, psychology, and sociology is helpful and at times unusually incisive. Its discussion of such varied areas as dialectical materialism or aesthetic experience is most

stimulating as is the challenge to more sympathetic interest in mysticism and parapsychology. But, unfortunately, stimulation, analysis, or criticism is not always synonymous with precision or the ability to convince. Diagnosis is fine but the cure for discovered pathological conditions in modern thought is not always prescribed with care. As in discussing flying saucers or parapsychology, this reviewer must side with those sceptical of Rowland's diagnosis of a real problem so he must question Rowland's prescription for all men to seek their resolution of such "mysteries" as are revealed by the limits of our knowledge in many areas in a davout attitude toward what lies beyond. This may keep life more interesting and man humble but how does it give understanding, meaning, or determine man's place and destiny? Man is not truly human because he acknowledges mystery behind science or the impossibility of a purely material world; rather he is human when he sees in this "spiritual" realm that which commands commitment as to its meaning. And, objective meaning does not arise from mystical or irrational subjectivity.

Connolly's work on the other hand, written to show that the philosophy of nature is neither a mere propaedeutic to metaphysics nor a special metaphysics as frequently interpreted by his fellow Catholic thinkers, fails in part in that it, as in the Thomistic tendencies he abhors, does not escape the limitations inherent in applying Aristotelian concepts to twentieth century problems. It is the author's thesis that while inferior to metaphysics, philosophy of nature is not subalternated to it in order of specification of either as sciences and that on the other hand philosophy of nature is only perfected, completed, and given ultimate meaning by metaphysics.

If he is correct, and his case is well presented, he is in more danger than usual of lapsing into one of two Procrustean beds. If the views he criticizes had the advantage of operational validity, relatively independent of Catholic metaphysic, Connolly's view must suffer from all those pointed queries modern scientific theory must raise to questions, attitudes, and analyses couched in and dependent on the inadequacies of Aristotelian and Thomistic categories. On the other hand, he is led to an even closer need than usual of harmonizing the data of nature, natural theology, and the Creator as seen through Thomistic eyes. Here he must bear anew a criticism Reformed theology has often raised as to this harmony. It leads to immanentism, according existence to God by pure potentiality and knowledge of Him by abstract reason resulting from the particulars of experience. God now becomes virtually identified with the phenomena of nature.

Finally, if it is myopic enthusiasm to claim that current scientific thought is more at home with theology than in recent years (which is more a fact of Christian attitude than it is perhaps of scientists' belief or ambi-

tion), while readily showing why it was not so in the past but why it will continue to be in the future, this failure common in church history must judge Mascall. Unlike many prior and present authors, however, his spirit is open and undogmatic thus desiring new light and new avenues of rapprochment. But this reviewer feels it suffers from his Anglican Thomistic attitude toward the value of this new variety of cosmological argument he espouses which, if it is to be valid, must tend to make certain of the arguments independent of future work in science or theology.

The reviewer can recommend this book as intensely stimulating to thought, as cogent and meaty, and as the readiest source of a vast erudition in contemporary scientific theory and philosophy one is likely to see in the near future. Different than Ramm's recent work in that it is less a defensive vindication of Scripture than an attempt at theological inclusion of the scientific spirit, less drawn on American Conservative lines of debate on questions of evolution, creation, and psychology and more on a free pursuit of research and philosophical frontiers in these areas, and less a handbook of methods than a theological and theoretical treatment of broad scope, it should yet provide a worthy companion to it. The reviewer plans to use both in his college course in Science and the Christian Religion.

The author is very well read and equipped for his task though this doesn't protect him from the human failure to be rather selective at times in his sources (notably the use of the Catholic Eccles' work on neurophysiology to the exclusion of a vast army of dissenters). He is highly critical of sloppy defense of theological belief and refuses to lower the Bampton Lectureship, of which the book is the product, to the level of much apologetic material with its special pleading or unwarranted dogmatism. For him the exercise is urbane and cautious. Finally he refuses to perform an unholy wedlock of science and dogmatics by compromising either. He refuses to science the finality it desired a century ago and to the liberal or conservative theologian the right to harmonize in undue haste so as to violate the spirit of science or the sancity of Biblical teaching. Rather, in some ways as in Ramm's early chapters, he seeks to set problem areas in their clearest light and point out only that science does not limit theistic belief or revelation. Unlike Rowland above, he allows something other than science to set the bounds of areas of experience.

The above four books should be read in the order mentioned. The intellectual satisfaction of the appetite in knowing what modern thought on scientific methods is, will be most pleasant.

—*Thomas H. Leith*

All Ye that Labor, by Lester De Koster. Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Pub. Co., 1956. 128 pp. $1.50.

This is the first of a series of monographs by contemporary evangelical writers. Already, several have appeared and the Eerdmans publishers are to be congratulated in their undertaking. The volumes will serve as useful centers around which fuller discussions of the various topics can take place. And, the subjects are of such a nature not only as to stimulate but to demand additional discussion; for example: authority, Genesis I, and the Modernist-Fundamentalist conflict.

This essay by the director of the Library at Calvin College and Seminary on Christianity, Communism, and the problem of evil resolves the conflict between the two world-views into their respective attitudes toward evil. Christianity is understood to view evil as overcome only by good, while Communism puts its trust in force. Basically, the two viewpoints are contrasted as differing religions with their opposing explanations of and solutions to the problem of evil in individual and collective human life. By "evil", De Koster means to include natural as well as moral evil, but the major considerations are concerned with the latter in its social manifestation. The presentation is more popular than technical, but according to the publishers it is still an attempt "to give the latest results of research and reflection."

De Koster considers the essence of the Christian criticism of Communism to be that "Communism does not analyze accurately the nature, the cause, or the cure of evil in society" (24). After a lucid chapter (II) of exposition of the Communist theory, he contrasts Capitalism and the concept of the classless society and concludes that Christ's injunction, "Seek ye first the Kingdom of Heaven, and then all these things shall be added unto you" is the Christian defense of property. He adds that this agrees neither with Marxism or classical economics (68), since Christianity never considers property an end in itself (66).

Evaluating Communism by the canons of self-consistency and consonance with experience (one is most happy for this insistence upon rational criteria), De Koster concludes that Marx founders upon the contradiction between his view that man can successfully labor for his own salvation as a free agent and his insistence that man is really not free and responsible for the evil he does since he is determined by economic laws in all his actions (86-87). But, at the same time, classical capitalist economics did not take evil seriously and indeed is in part responsible for the rise of Marxism (113). Only as a *laissez-faire* capitalism is modified by considerations of humanity, morality, justice, and religious values, can an effective opponent to Marx be put on the field (114).

De Koster has produced a well-written, lively volume that takes its stand on an excellent knowledge of the history and literature of the topics under discussion. It is not, of course, without weakness. One of these is over-simplification. Note this in his suggestion that in distributing our food surpluses to the needy of the world we must not allow economic considerations to stay our hand. One may ask why we should not, then, contribute to the upbuilding of the physical health of the mass of the Russian people. Indeed, if we do this, we may merely strengthen an irresponsible dictatorship and give the oppressors of the Russian people a stronger army with which to subjugate free peoples everywhere. Thus, are only short-range considerations to enter our thinking?

A strong stand has been taken against De Koster's presentation by the editor of *Progressive Calvinism,* Frederick Nymeyer. His position is that De Koster's views are actually the kind that have helped Communism to grow in strength and influence. "As far as he [De Koster] goes, what he says appears to be generally right and always brilliantly done" (III, 4, 114). Nymeyer's complaint is that his deficiency is not in what he says but in what he fails to say. *Progressive Calvinism* believes that De Koster does not actually come to grips with Communism head-on but "evades arguing about it because he does not know how to answer the basic communist argument" (115). The real issue turns on one's acceptance or rejection of the commandment, "Thou shalt not steal" and Marx's doctrine that the owner of productive capital is not entitled to any "unearned" income (116). Nymeyer contends that De Koster has not attempted to defend God's legislation. What he has done is to avoid the economic issue by giving his discussion over to less relevant philosophical problems created by Marxism (125).

Nymeyer further criticizes De Koster as advocating state interventionism since he places a positive value on the state as the agent of the people entering into economic life to strengthen the national conomy (*Progressive Calvinism,* III, 7, 214). Nymeyer sees this view as predicated on the assumption that political man is more trustworthy than economic man —an obviously indefensible position. Thus, he would not allow that De Koster really favors capitalism with its free market, private ownership of capital, and outlawing of economic coercion, but that he actually promotes a type of interventionism which, though it allows private ownership of capital, yet would regulate the market and exercise coercive economic pressure (albeit, restrained and legalized). Undoubtedly, De Koster would admit the basic analysis of his position, by whatever name it is called, and he has admitted that the variable factors on such a system constitute a danger: The entrance of the state into economic life always involves "the threat of being carried too far" (114).

In sum, then, it appears that Nymeyer has uncovered at least two basic weaknesses in De Koster's presentation: (1) a failure to deal fully and defensively with the right to "unearned" income (2) a lack of specifics justifying and controlling his idea of limited state intervention.

At the end of the volume there is a selected bibliography which should prove most helpful for further study of the subject. —*Lloyd F. Dean*

Presbyterian Liturgies, by Charles W. Baird. Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1957. 266 pp. $3.00.

In 1855 there was published *Eutaxia, or the Presbyterian Liturgies* by America's leading liturgical historian, Charles W. Baird. The publisher has done evangelicals a service indeed by this timely republication. There is not only a glaring weakness in today's evangelical public worship, but a positive deterioration. For some time popular Christian magazines have been castigating the current trends toward "hillbillyism in religion." Here is a book which would uphold and elevate the minister as liturgete whether he officiates in a free or a prescribed service.

Baird traces the origin of the reformed services from Calvin to Knox, through the Puritans and to the Reformed Dutch Church. He closes the book with an historical survey of the American Churches at the close of the Revolution and the steps which were taken to reestablish the services of various denominations since the severance of ties from mother countries. The breadth of Baird's knowledge in his field is shown by the most interesting quotations at the head of each chapter.

The liturgies here considered deal largely with the aspect of prayer in the various services and sacraments. One is struck with the appropriateness of the sentiment for the occasion, the scriptural language in which the authors were saturated, and the unity of the prayer. One of the most moving sections of the book is Chapter VI, "The First Sacrament in Scotland." The persons participating in the ancient baronial house of Calder and the very words of John Knox are here recorded that lift the pious heart to the very throne of grace. In contrast, what poverty many of us experience today in most of our free churches as we are pushed through a labyrinth of unthought sentences of disconnected fragments and weasel words with often slang expressions to Him Who is God alone! How enriched our public worship would become with the frequent use of the great prayerful utterances of the saints of old which are so appropriate for our day.

If the republication of this important liturgical work can inspire ministers today to put half as much thought and preparation upon their public prayers as upon their sermons, it will have been worthwhile. The publishers might well consider the revival of another incentive to godly worship in Samuel Miller's *Thoughts on Public Prayer* originally published in 1849. —*Charles G. Schauffele*

The Use of Music in Christian Education, by Vivian Morsch. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1956. 171 pp. $3.00.

Although this is a short book it assays to set forth "a basic philosophy of music as Christian Education, and applies it to the purposes of the teaching program in worship, curriculum development, program areas of faith, witness outreach, and fellowship, and to the teaching procedures in the organizations of the church, including the church school and the choirs" (9). It should find great favor with teachers everywhere as it advocates the use of choral speech, the author whetting the interest of the Christian educator to know more and to use more of this asset to corporate worship by a broad knowledge of American church usages and many practical suggestions.

The study begins with the assertion that music is a language of religion so that "the highest level of church music can never be attained, nor can its purpose be fulfilled, until congregations can recognize it and understand it as a means of communication with God and man" (17). This has a familiar ring to those who remember A. J. Gordon's stirring little book *How Christ Came to Church.* In the following chapter this thesis is followed out in a firm stand for the theistic basis for the origin and use of music in worship. "To consider the view of worship . . . except as stemming from God, would be superficial and profane. . . . Man is drawn by God into worship. . . . God is the initiator of the worship relationship. . . . It is not man's needs and wishes that first evoke worship. It is God alone who matters, and God's Presence which incites man's soul to respond in adoration" (18-19).

Another chapter attacks a besetting problem of many worship services: the use of hymns. With keen insight and nice discrimination the author makes a list of "Twenty-five Hymns to Grow On." These are recommended for the whole congregation to sing together from the primary department up. Notable for their absence are the gospel songs and ecclesiastical jazz which so undermine true worship among our evangelical children. In support of the best in Christian music, the author writes, "The first consideration of music in the church school is the relation to the strengthening of the Christian faith and to worship" (40). This is a conclusion which few church leaders have accepted, as judged by their choice and use of music.

A rare note in any book today is sounded later in "Christian Discipline and Church Choirs." "Christian discipline consists in training in obedience to Christ and in living according to His standards" (128). This section is a plea to those concerned to make choir relationships truly Christian. The quiet matter-of-fact way in which the author assumes that

daily personal prayer and Bible study is a necessity for every believer brings a tone of personal piety so needed today among all who serve in the courts of the Lord.

This should prove to be a very useful book!

—*Charles G. Schauffele*

Co-operation Without Compromise, by James DeForest Murch. Grand Rapids, Wm. B. Eerdmans Pub. Co., 1956. viii + 220 pp. $3.50.

Many people have assumed that the battle between fundamentalism and liberalism was fought and finished during the 1920's. Time has proven these people wrong for the thirties were only a breathing spell preparatory to another outbreak in the battle. By 1940-1941 many conservatives had had enough of attempted co-operation with the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America (46). Within days of each other two groups took action to organize for purposes of Christian fellowship. There emerged the American Council of Christian Churches (ACCC) and the National Association of Evangelicals (NAE). This book is the only complete history of the latter movement — a movement which in its inception and growth was born out of criticism of the Federal Council (see especially chapters two and three entitled "The Great Apostasy" and "The Battle of the Century," and statements such as on p. 154 or "approved" texts such as Wright's *Death in the Pot,* Gordon's *Ecclesiastical Octopus* and many of Murch's own writings).

Mr. Murch has done an admirable piece of work in presenting the first full story of the NAE. Like the organization itself he covers a whole range of activities — education, foreign missions, social action, Sunday schools, broadcasting, etc. In fact, after such a presentation the reader might wonder how American Christianity survived without the NAE and if there are any Christian organizations outside of the NAE. However, similar questions could be asked about the Federal Council after reading Hutchinson's *We Are Not Divided.*

The reader will certainly appreciate the extensive and generally good documentation. However, this could have been strengthened in places with specific references to types of materials used rather than the frequent "From data furnished the author by —." A greater degree of objectivity would also have been achieved had the author given more indication of having read, or at least attempting to answer, authors critical of the NAE. Certainly McIntire's *Twentieth Century Reformation* can add to the story of the crucial October 1941 meeting at the Moody Bible Institute (52-53), and it seems strange that Murch, a critic of the FCC, should quote an affiliate of the FCC approvingly to discredit the ACCC.

That the NAE has honest differences with the ACCC is not to be denied. They should be faced realistically. Merrill Tenney has suggested (on the book's jacket) that this is an apologetic. With this we agree, but should not an apologetic seek to deal fully with all problems involved in an issue? It is at this point that the book is weak, for it fails to show clearly how the NAE differs from the ACCC. This difference could have been clarified in part had some indication of "Mr. McIntire's statement" (58) to the St. Louis Convention been given.

This reviewer believes that the author incorrectly assesses the spirit of liberalism when he claims (30) such ministers lack conviction and passion. Studies of liberalism and the social gospel show that liberalism had plenty of conviction and passion, even if of a variety unpalatable to evangelicals! It might not be amiss to suggest that perhaps it has been the evangelicals who have lacked conviction and courage — this reflected in the attitude many have of "theological peace at any price." Be that as it may, Mr. Murch speaks quite accurately when he suggests "American liberalism had a genius for ecclesiastical politics." More ministers should heed his plea for greater emphasis upon exegetical preaching.

The author omits any reference to the financial side of the NAE, such as incomes and expenditures, and it is unfortunate for posterity that this edition contains no photographs. Readers will find the index useful while the student of American church history will be disappointed by the absence of a bibliography. It is hoped that minor errors calling Marx's *Manifesto* the *Humanist Manifesto* (21), naming interdenominational Wheaton College and Moody as undenominational schools (48) and locating Gordon Divinity School, of Beverly Farms since 1951, in Boston (93) will be corrected in the next edition. Despite weaknesses however, *Co-operation Without Compromise* demands the attention of all interested in the ecumenical movement. — *C. Milburn Keen, Jr.*

Evangelical Responsibility in Contemporary Theology, by Carl Henry. Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Pub. Co., 1957. 89 pp. $1.50

Fundamentalism and the Church, by Gabriel Hebert. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1957. 156 pp. $3.00.

At the present time there would appear to be a renaissance of solid thought within the evangelical wing of the church on varied issues of contemporary import. Such vitality is not going entirely unnoticed by those of different persuasion nor is it occurring without voices from within being raised to further stimulate and challenge. The second of the above books is of the former type and the first of the latter. Hebert writes with the

desire of increased rapport between his group, the more liberal Student Christian Movement, and the evangelical Varsity Christian Fellowship. These are the two major Protestant religious elements on many campuses around the world. Eerdmans publishes in the Pathway studies Henry's pointed addresses to the students of two leading Evangelical Schools, Northern Baptist Theological Seminary and Calvin College.

Henry's lectures in historical vein cover Modernism and Liberalism, the Fundamentalist reaction, the neo-Orthodox revision, and the Conservative challenge to these. Distinctions are made as clear as possible and Henry goes about his task well. Fundamentalism and Conservatism are opposed through attitude rather more than by theology. Henry deplores in the former its reactionary tendencies, harsh temperament, loveless and strife-ridden spirit as exemplified by its lack of insight into the full sweep of a Christian world view, a neglect of the intellectual and cultural role of the church, undue stress on non-essential items of theology, separation in ecclesiastical affairs, and an anti-scientific bent. His final chapter calls for a Conservative correction.

One may note several items in this regard within Henry's suggested strategy. There will be less agreement on degrees of correction needed and on methods of bringing it about than on the more descriptive or analytic discussions of the problems themselves. Some will deplore his ecumenical tendencies and others will decry his rather detached academician's attitude toward the rub of everyday controversy. This reviewer feels that there is a present widening in the evangelical American scene between the Fundamentalist and the Conservative camps and it will be increasingly exemplified by the reactions of each to these two points in particular. But there is a growing eschatological, economic, political, and scientific variance of views as well which will leave neither camp in sweetness and light. One can but hope that Henry's positive cautions and fine regard for major evangelical responsibilities may govern as large elements of both groups in these issues as possible.

Hebert, on the other hand, does not carefully distinguish between the two wings and in his attempt at reconciliation of these with his own views his discussion suffers from lack of care with the distinctives. He does rather vaguely recognize the difference, but defining obscurantism, anti-scientific attitude, and so on from a different perspective than Henry, the two tend to be grouped together. This results in an apparent ignorance of the real principles at the heart of informed, clear-thinking, and scholarly Conservatism at its best. Since he discusses largely the Inter-Varsity movement, the infallibility of Scripture, and the nature of the church these reveal throw into bold relief the problems that lack of clarity and precision institute.

In his analysis of the V.C.F., he appears to feel that, because Conservatives deplore the methods of defending the truth seen in some Fundamentalist works, it thereby should consider such truth as only possible or partial (as he does) and thus not subject to vigorous defense. Nothing could be further from the case. The vigorous, careful, and scholarly pen today in defense of the Christian *Weltanschauung* is, if anything, more aware of the breadth of the revelation it defends than the more vocal or flambuoyant pleas of the past. Hebert's eclectic mystical irrationalism has little to offer such a reasoned case.

On the basis of assumed closed-mindedness and defensive attitude on the part of those with a high view of inspiration, Hebert raises the charge of low scholarship. What he fails to realize is that his mode of discussion and his frequent lack of careful analysis of the position of those he accuses is a cause of the impasse frequently met in attempting mutual discussion. Similarly he fails to define precisely the niceties of his own rather neo-supernaturalistic view of the distinction between the fallible Bible and the Word of God speaking through it. In this he is little better off than some Fundamentalists' rather mechanical and crude views of God's revelatory methods and, what is more important, he ignores the witness of Scripture to itself. Certainly Conservatives, while hermeneutically improving the former in the light of new researches and linguistic theories, have tried carefully to build upon the latter. Even the worst of Fundamentalistic discussion was based on the highest motives. Is this not preferable to a sophisticated attitude based on ignoring in large part the Scriptural witness to itself and the failure to show how the humanistic spirit in much he says is to be harmonized with his Christian beliefs?

As to the nature of the church the author is particularly vague. Frequently-held evangelical attitudes are ignored or confused with outmoded or minority viewpoints. The visible and invisible church, the respective roles of faith and works in Christian fellowship, and the distinction between ecumenicism based on common beliefs and purposes are all badly confused. If Hebert, and others like him, desire evangelicals to accept their pleas for exploration of further fellowship, they ought to recognize what is distinctive to the two wings of evangelical theology and their great areas of agreement. Confusing or ignoring either is not likely to gain them much of an audience.

—*Thomas H. Leith*

Commentary on the Pastoral Epistles, by Patrick Fairbairn. Grand Rapids: Zondervan Publishing House, 1956. xi + 451 pp. $5.95.

Commentary on the Epistle to the Ephesians, by John Eadie. Grand Rapids: Zondervan Publishing House, 1956. lv + 492 pp. $5.95.

Commentary on the Epistle to the Colossians, by John Eadie. Grand Rapids: Zondervan Publishing House, 1957. xlvi + 308 pp. $4.95.

These three volumes are among the latest offerings in the *Classic Commentary Series,* in which the Zondervan Publishing House has reprinted some of the standard works of the last century. In these cases the choice was particularly felicitous, for the volumes in question had become exceedingly scarce, to the point of being almost unobtainable. Furthermore these commentaries were prepared by exceptionally competent men, not only versed in Greek and exegetical skill; but steeped as well in a sound Reformed theology. Thus in the books before us we have an admirable combination, where exegesis is regulated, without being constrained, by a wholesome perspective upon the full orb of revealed truth, and where the latter is in turn established and sharpened by skillful exegesis on the areas touched upon by our Epistles. Of course, due to the fact that these works appeared around the third quarter of the nineteenth century, one could scarcely expect them to be abreast of later critical trends. For their own time, however, they were remarkably up to date, and for our day they are still very highly serviceable, first because their understanding and exposition of Pauline thought is admirably apt, and secondly because many of the so-called newer critical approaches have after all very much in common with the older theories, and a discussion of the latter has often considerable bearing on the former as well.

We recommend heartily these volumes to the diligent student of the Word and the conscientious pastor, and we wish to express here our gratitude to the Zondervan Publishing House for having the vision to make these works again available on the market. —*Roger R. Nicole*

Unger's Bible Dictionary, edited by Merrill Unger. Chicago: Moody Press, 1957. vii + 1192 pp., illustrated. $8.95.

Unger's Bible Dictionary is a new and thoroughly revised edition of the *People's Bible Encyclopedia,* a very good one volume encyclopedia that appeared in 1900 edited by Charles Randall Barnes. Another edition, with an archeological supplement by M. G. Kyle appeared in 1913. While many of the longer articles have been revised and there are a number of fine new articles, e.g., The Exodus, The Dead Sea Scolls, the bulk of the book is substantially that of the earlier edition. This is not said in criticism but in praise, for the earlier book was a good one. This revision is a welcome

and a valuable aid, especially for the lay reader and Bible student. Even the scholar, however, will find much helpful and suggestive material here. We are pleased to note the more extended and much more satisfactory treatment of the individual books of the Bible, instead of the brief paragraphs of the former edition. The *Dictionary* calls itself "the latest and largest Bible Dictionary" and we would add that it is probably the most satisfactory of one volume dictionaries. What is even more surprising is the price of $8.95. The book is well and sturdily bound and has a large number of photographs, drawings and maps.

Depending on one's point of view, the book is marred or improved to a slight degree by the Dispensational bias that appears in pertinent articles. Although the editor states, "Important Biblical doctrines are presented — yet not as held by any one group, but as subscribed to by the various segments of the Church as a whole," either by implication or by unwarranted statement he is misleading. An article on the "Millennium," for example, states that "Postmillennialism . . . is practically a dead issue," an observation that will come as quite a surprise to a large segment of evangelical Christianity. An article on the "Second Coming" fairly presents the various views, but concludes with a statement that seems rather out of place in a Bible Dictionary, "Exhaustive inductive study of the Scripture seems to favor the pretribulation rapture view."

In spite of the individual theological disagreements, we are more than pleased with Dr. Unger's work and enthusiastically recommend this Dictionary to the Christian public. — *Philip C. Johnson*

SURVEY OF SIGNIFICANT ARTICLES

THOMAS H. LEITH

American Association of University Professors Bulletin, December. This issue contains articles on faculty salaries, the role of the segregationist, and "Quiescence, Tradition, and Disorder — Cross-section of a Small College."

American Scholar, Winter. Max Lerner, "The Frontiers of the Human Condition" and an article on conservatism today are included.

American Scientist, December. Has "On Methods of Evolutionary Biology and Anthropology" by Th. Dobzhansky and J. Birdsell.

Anglican Theological Review, July. W. N. Pittenger writes "Religious Language." The October issue has articles on the ontology of Tillich, natural law, personalist Christian metaphysics, and the Word of God in the church.

Atlantic Monthly in November has articles by Jung, Conant, and Niebuhr on the soul, education, and secularism in America respectively. The number for December has a section on Mass Communications.

Behavioral Science, October. Includes articles on anthropology as a comparative science, on disharmony in Federal government, and on communication systems and social systems.

Journal of Bible and Religion, October. Has articles on the possibility of theologies communicating, the ground of Biblical authority, and the empirical grounding of the goodness of God.

Christian Scholar for December includes a number of articles on the arts and Christianity.

College of the Bible Quarterly has several articles on ecumenicity in the October issue.

Concordia Theological Monthly, January. H. Hamann, Jr. writes "Justification by Faith in Modern Theology."

Dublin Review for Winter has articles on the Holy Ghost in history and on the moral issues of modern communication.

Ethics, October. A. Child, "Five Conceptions of History" and E. E. Harris, "Political Power" are important.

Etc. for Autumn has H. Toch on the psychology of heresy.

Eternity for December has Eugene Nida, "How Mary Holds Allegiance" and W. Thorn, "Tax Deductions, the Lord's Money and You." In January Bernard Ramm writes on the coming crisis in our Christian colleges.

Free University Quarterly, November. Includes articles on the wise men of Israel and on crime and religious profession.

Foreign Affairs has K. Davis, "Political Impact of New Population Trends" in January.

Journal of Higher Education for November has "Whither Higher Education?" by Crane Brinton.

His in December includes Ernest White, "Why I Believe in God" and Jewett continues on Brunner's social ethics. In January there is a whole issue on missions. See specially the articles on inter-racial marriage, Hinduism, and the need for mission majors in seminaries.

Humanist, Number 6. Paul Blanshard discusses "Has Catholic Policy Changed?"

Interpretation for October includes an article on modern spiritualism.

Moody Monthly has J. Free, "Archaeology Since Mid-Century" and C. Halter, "What is Good Church Music?" in November.

Musical Quarterly for October includes Pius XII's encyclical on sacred music.

National Geographic, December. G. E. Wright, "Bringing Old Testament Times to Life."

Nature, November 2. N. W. Pirie, "The Origins of Life."

New Republic for November 18 and 25 and December 2 has an article on "A Catholic for President?"

Pastoral Psychology includes articles on the meaning of the funeral in Christian history in the issue for November.

Personalist, Winter. R. T. Flewelling, "The Battle of the Scrolls."

Journal of Philosophy, November 7. Adolph Crunbaum and Michael Scriven write on determination in the light of recent physics. Three others discuss the nature of philosophical analysis. In December 19 there are articles on modern philosophy and God and on a rationale for science. P. W. Taylor's social science and ethical relativism are in the January 2 issue.

Physics Today for November has A. V. Austin, "Scientists and Public Responsibility."

Political Science Quarterly for September includes Chas. Frankel on "Philosophy and History" and in December has an article on the study of corruption in politics.

Practical Anthropology has articles on "African Political Systems and African Church Policy" and "Conflicts and Contradictions in African Christianity" in the September-October issue.

Reformed Journal for June has articles on our reasonable faith and on "Does Christianity Make Sense?" The October number has an article on the intellectual life and the November issue has some thoughts on woman suffrage in the church. J. Timmerman writes on the Christian novel in December.

Reformed Review in October has articles on Islam and missions and on racial prejudice, the sin of our century.

Journal of Religion, October. Includes articles on philosophy of religion and Christian theology, Judaism and the Christian theologian, the historical Kierkegaard, and St. Thomas and Tillich on the names of God.

Religion in Life, Winter. Includes a symposium on Protestants in Latin America and has Rudolph Bultmann on miracles.

Religious Educaiton for November-December has a symposium on man in current culture.

Reporter of December 26 has an editorial and article by G. de Santillana on "Minds on Trial: Galileo and Oppenheimer," while the issue of January 9 has W. Fairfield, "The High Cost of Scientific Secrecy."

Review and Expositor, October. G. H. Ranson, "The Christian Doctrine of Vocation."

Review of Metaphysics has R. Demos, "Some Reflections on Threats and Punishments" in December.

Science of November 29 has articles on science and psychology in Russia; of December 13 has W. Weaver, "Science and the Citizen;" and of December 27 and January 10 has reports of radiocarbon dating at Columbia and Univ. of Arizona.

Science and Society in the Fall has Marxist articles on Veblen's economics, Hobson and human welfare, and Johann Sebastian Bach.

Scientific American in December has J. E. Weckler, "Neanderthal Man."

Scientific Monthly for December includes articles on the scientist in contemporary fiction and on scientific progress and political science.

Scottish Journal of Theology. The latest issue has articles on the Holy Spirit and tradition, religious symbols, and Biblical authority and the Continental reformation.

Seminary Review, Spring-Summer. G. M. Elliot, "Future Life in the Old Testament."

Speculum includes J. A. Mazzeo, "The Analogy of Creation in Dante" in October.

Theology for December includes C. F. Evans, "The Bible and Tradition" and J. Mark, "The Christian Approach to Economic Problems."

Thomist, October. Has an article on Thomism and positivism.

Yale Review includes Reinhold Niebuhr's "Liberty and Equality" in the Autumn number and Alberto Moravia, "The Sterility of Suffering" in the Winter issue.

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

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